

## **PLANNING & IMPLEMENTATION DEVELOPMENT: GOVERNMENT-NGO IMPERATIVES\***

PATRICIA J. ALAILIMA

### **1. Introduction**

Non-government organisations (NGOs) started in most countries with relief and welfare-oriented service delivery aimed at alleviating the immediate consequences of poverty on a temporary basis. Some have subsequently moved into development-oriented programmes which are multisectoral in nature, aimed at making their target groups self-reliant, and their projects viable and sustainable. Still others have become catalysts, facilitating the development of other organisations, their capacities and linkages, so that they can meet the designated needs of their target groups on a sustained basis. A few NGOs have started social movements, based on networks and coalitions of NGOs and aimed at achieving sustainable, people-centred development through social transformation.

Many governments are still unsure of the roles of NGOs in their countries i.e. whether they are competitive with or substitutes for government, or whether they can and do complement government activities/agencies in national development. At issue is not just the pooling of resources and the division of tasks among organisations according to their relative strengths. Also at stake is the sharing of power. Tensions exist at almost all working levels of government in virtually all countries. While many NGOs have remained small and continued to operate on an informal, voluntary basis at primary level, some grew and became so large and powerful that they could work above government bureaucracies and directly tap foreign resources; these NGOs can be perceived as a political or security threat and invite the institution of regulatory state control on foreign funds. Other NGOs have changed their radical stance as social movements and organisations of dissent/protest so as to be more acceptable and to work with their governments in designated programmes and service delivery.

Government organisations and NGOs also have basic differences in their approaches to programme planning and implementation. NGOs are generally process-oriented and try to ensure that income benefits, decision-making power and control accrue to their target groups; however some still tend to focus more on building efficient delivery systems and use the "top-down" approach. Government organisations generally favour the top-down approach and use conventional methods. The three strategies used by NGOs i.e. empowerment,

---

\*This paper contains extracts from a study done for the United Nations-ESCAP by the author entitled "Fiscal Incentives to Support the Growth and Viability of NGOs".

mobilisation and development imply different degrees and quality of dependence on the state. Based on the premise that the State is entrusted with certain duties and functions by society, NGOs also have the unique role of drawing attention to deficiencies in government planning, programming or service delivery, thereby making the government accountable to the people and the development process more participatory and transparent. There are instances, however, where dependency relationships have emerged between NGOs and their target groups, as has happened in government-administered programmes.

This paper will focus on the range of mechanisms currently operating in the Asian region to engender co-operation between governments and NGOs in the planning and implementation of development activities. Section 2 deals with the different working relationships governments and NGOs have developed in planning and implementation activities. Section 3 covers the funding arrangements by which these activities are supported. The paper concludes (Section 4) with recommendations on how the capacity of NGOs to participate more effectively in planning and implementation can be increased through organisational and staff development, movement towards financial independence and increased sustainability, improved accountability and strengthened inter-organisational relationships.

For the purpose of this study, a NGO is defined as "any non-governmental organisation which is engaged in community-based, service-oriented and/or development-oriented activities without a profit motive and with the underlying objective of being of service". Such a definition distinguishes this set of institutions from those in the private sector, which have a profit motive, but also support community and other development activities.

## **2. Government-NGO Collaboration in Planning & Implementation**

The strength of the NGO sector lies in its ability to reach the poor and understand the microprocesses relating to development, while at the same time being more innovative and cost-effective. NGOs, having smaller, less hierarchical and low-cost administrative structures, are flexible and have more space for individual initiative, can mobilise creative/committed workers, and do not need to work within the political patronage system. These institutional characteristics facilitate effective collaboration among disciplines, rapid decision-making, quick responses to eventualities and a work ethic.

However, in order to influence the macro-context within which NGO projects operate, collaboration with government at the policy level, in planning, in programme implementation and in the evaluation of programmes and projects is important for NGOs. NGO innovations and experience could be communicated to a much wider audience and influence government technology and programme

development. Better communication would also improve NGO knowledge of the concessions provided to them and their access to the specialised skills and facilities available in the public sector.

The Philippines is the only country where encouragement of the growth, development and participation of NGOs in all levels of decision-making is enshrined in the Constitution (1987); further, the Medium Term Philippines Development Plan (1993-98) has, as one of its main objectives, "people empowerment" and recognises NGOs as partners in development. As the political direction changed, (from one of antagonism under Marcos, to one of enthusiastic support under Aquino), several NGO leaders were included in government and the institutionalisation of NGO participation was attempted. Government-NGO consultative mechanisms at national, regional and provincial levels were set up. In-house liaison bureaus, offices or desks were started in all line departments and government agencies to deal with NGOs and peoples' organisations. Where special community assistance programmes were developed, specific components were demarcated for NGOs (*Hamili*, 1991). NGO partnership in development planning was encouraged through obtaining their participation in inter-agency sub-committees of government, and in public hearings and consultations. However the technical capacity of NGOs to contribute to policy formulation was lacking and they did not provide the necessary expertise to those included in the government. The public statements made did not percolate down and change attitudes and processes in line Ministries and at the local level.

More recently, however, the appointment of two Secretaries (to the Departments of Health and Agrarian Reform) who were former NGO leaders, together with several of their staff, has brought about the introduction of NGO methods in these spheres; a recognition of the value of these methods has resulted in changed approaches and the introduction of tripartite consultations between the NGOs, local people and the government for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Government has also opened up new areas for NGO participation and their representatives have been included in the top policy-making body on the environment, the Philippines Council on Sustainable Development. NGOs in the Philippines are now aware that they have to build up their technical competence and backing for their representatives.

In the context of the devolution of health and public works and a doubling of the funds allocated to local government, NGOs in the Philippines are also now more concerned with strengthening their ties with local government and the line agencies implementing development projects and in building up grassroots peoples' organisations. The participation of most NGOs, however, is still at the programme implementation level.

As the number of NGOs within a country grows rapidly, and there are increasing constraints on the government's ability to implement programmes, NGOs may tend to be seen as vehicles for implementing programmes designed by government, as well as for ensuring the successful delivery of government services through mobilising the people to get what they are entitled to and ensuring the proper delivery of programmes run by implementing agencies. Indian NGOs are highly diversified and are proliferating with the increasing attention paid to them by the government and the foreign funding agencies. The Eighth Plan (1992-97) envisages a government-NGO partnership in the implementation of poverty alleviation programmes i.e. "*the voluntary organisation can act as a catalyst and can organise beneficiaries, involve people in planning and development and provide the necessary support to make development a reality*" (Vol.II p.39). Some agencies, e.g. the Central Social Welfare Board, the Department of Women and Child Development already implement all their programmes through NGOs.

In Bangladesh, government prefers to utilise NGOs where necessary to supplement government programmes rather than adopting a broad collaborative and cooperative strategy. Significant collaboration has taken place in the health, education and agriculture sectors in the role of stimulating awareness, organisation and demand, the most successful being where key components are separately managed by NGOs. The Fourth Five Year Plan indicates a concern with how to involve NGOs further in each sector, but there is no institutionalised process for consultation and government departments and politicians still think of them as being in competition for funds. A degree of tension also exists due to differences between central government agencies and NGOs in values, ideology and development priorities and the regulatory control mechanisms on foreign funds; at the periphery the opposition is less. NGOs have, however, contributed to the restructuring of government's poverty-related programmes and the introduction of new structures, procedures and techniques in rural development work.

In Indonesia, collaboration between Government agencies and NGOs is promoted through legislative measures and dialogues. NGOs are being developed at all levels-village, regencies, provinces and up to national level and are coordinated at each level by a government organisation. Government determines general development policies, guides and assists, and supervises NGOs. The NGOs which collaborate are implementors of service provision as sub-contractors or participants in joint project undertakings. Where NGOs undertake projects on their own or with non-government resources, they select their own target groups, adopt their own development approach and have a large degree of autonomy. In general, they have chosen to operate under the umbrella of official development slogans, but to redefine them in terms of paradigms more oriented towards participatory structures and democratic forms of community building. (Elridge 1989, quoted in Lazo & d' Silva, 1992)

Policy formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation are considered a government prerogative in Malaysia and as being within the sphere of its technical expertise. Public opinion is sought through conferences/seminars, and NGOs are involved in various joint consultative committees at state and national levels, chiefly because they have research, knowledge and skills; but in almost all cases these advisory roles do not allow the NGOs any veto power. There is little collaborative GA- NGO work and no NGO participation in planning, implementing or evaluating programmes. Individuals (in their personal capacities) who are also heads of NGOs are, however, appointed to Boards of Institutions and serve on prestigious bodies such as the National Economic Consultative Council (Ghee, 1991).

The Thai government sets out its policy guidelines and objectives in the Sixth National Economic & Social Development Plan and subscribes to the general objective of improving Government-NGO coordination and involving NGOs in all possible projects. A work plan details the responsibilities of relevant ministries and departments and signals to NGOs what activities may receive government support. The government agencies choose the target groups, and indicate where NGOs should help, but NGO participation in government programmes is very limited and little monitoring is done of impact or physical performance. As there are no clear policy guidelines on the NGOs developmental role and how they should relate to government agencies, the relationship is based almost entirely on personal contacts and relationships e.g. many NGOs have government officers serving on their boards; those that do not have contacts in the relevant government agency, tend to carry out their activities without reference to government plans; others, which are often unregistered, find they have no legitimate basis on which to coordinate with government agencies. The turnover of government staff at local level therefore hinders continuity of contacts and NGO participation in ongoing and new projects (Ghee, 1991).

There is also no formal structure for government-NGO collaboration in Sri Lanka. While government has continued to rely on voluntary organisations to provide welfare services and cooperate with government during crises, whether natural or man-made, its own approach to this sector has been ambivalent. It has shifted from a *laissez-faire* approach, to open encouragement of NGO activities and foreign funding for this sector, to a search for more effective supervisory and coordinating mechanisms. The existence of several NGO organisations with "umbrella" functions has resulted in none of them acquiring sufficient stature or technical expertise to play a significant role in policy making, planning or programme implementation. The majority of NGOs are sustained through the work of a key member, usually a (retired) government servant, who maintains his former contacts on an informal basis.

In Hong Kong and Singapore, there are effective coordinating “umbrella” organisations which can represent the NGO viewpoint at the higher decision-making levels and are sufficiently large and well-funded to provide the technical expertise necessary to cater to the wide range of NGO needs. In Hong Kong the level of cooperation between government and NGOs is almost unprecedented in the region. The Hong Kong Council of Social Services, (HKCSS) the coordinating body for over 200 member NGOs, is closely involved in policy formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation of services. Coordination among NGOs is effected through various service divisions of the HKCSS and cooperation with the government achieved through a series of working groups/committees of varying composition, biennial reviews to evaluate progress, identify needs etc, and the formulation of a “rolling plan”. In Singapore, while the government does the strategic planning, policy formulation, setting of standards, programme development etc. are jointly carried out by the government and the Singapore Council for Social Services (SCSS), the national coordinating body for the NGOs providing direct and indirect welfare services.

While such networks tend to suffer from problems of bureaucracy and poor or unequal representation of members’ concerns, they are also emerging in other countries as one of the significant interfaces between the NGO community and the state, which can provide self-regulation to the sector, as an alternative to state regulation e.g. the Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh, the National Council of Social Welfare of Thailand, the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Bombay. Most countries also have the affiliation of NGOs serving a particular sector e.g. the National Federation of NGOs for Drug Abuse Prevention in Pakistan, the NGO consortium for Relief and Rehabilitation in the North-East of Sri Lanka. While the small NGOs may not be able to afford the time and cost involved in seeking out government policy, consortia of large NGOs (e.g. in India) have been able to sometimes go further and influence policy to cater to their needs.

The Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) in the Philippines is a unique example of consensus building between a coalition of 10 major development NGO networks representing around 2000 NGOs which operate nationwide in a wide range of development work. The Covenant on Philippine Development represents the basis of the consensus and unity among the member networks and sets out the development principles and goals to be adhered to by its members; the rights, responsibilities and obligations that must be observed; and a consensus on how development can be achieved. Under discussion is a Code of Conduct which will provide guidelines for members.

However, in general, there is still a lack of effective working arrangements between government organisations and NGOs in most Asian countries due to a basic lack of understanding and awareness of NGOs within government circles

i.e. what NGOs are, how they operate, their basic principles, work approaches, needs and concerns. Where there is dialogue and consultation, the basis for government-NGO collaboration is not clear and there is a lack of effective institutional mechanisms for collaboration; the NGO role tends to be advisory and they are uncertain about how seriously their suggestions are taken. Where NGOs work closely within government programmes, they fear that they will be coopted and will not be able to remain critical and competitive and present an alternative development path.

### **3. NGO Financing for Planning & Implementation**

The provision of funding and the mechanisms used play a major role in determining government-NGO relationships, as well as the organisation and functioning of individual NGOs and their ability to participate effectively in planning and implementation. Some NGOs perceive the acceptance of government funds as the beginning of government control and subjugation to politicians. Others feel that dependence on foreign funds tarnishes the image of self-reliance. While most governments feel that NGOs should be accountable to them for the funding received from local and foreign sources, this mitigates against the objective of cooperation between government agencies and NGO on the basis of equality and recognition of NGO work.

Till fairly recently, in most countries of the Asian region, there has been a significant reliance on the public sector and confidence that governments are able to guide the economy at both aggregate and sectoral levels. Governments have been planning what economic agents should do, and the fiscal system has been geared accordingly. Fiscal incentives and funding mechanisms for NGOs have developed within this framework and are designed to reward those NGOs which fulfil the particular role envisaged by the government, or carry out specified services or activities. While the role and functions of NGOs has widened from purely charity work to development, sensitisation, policy, advocacy, research and coordination, most of the countries in the region have retained financing arrangements which are based on the conception that NGOs are mainly charities, run by volunteers, basically of a temporary nature and not needing to build up surpluses or institutional capacity.

However, confidence in governments' ability to guide the economy is now waning and increasing market orientation has shifted governments' role to planning and providing the physical and psychological environments which are conducive to the growth and development of economic entities.

### 3.1 *Fiscal Regimes*

The growing consensus is that the primary function of taxation is considered to be revenue collection. It is felt that goals such as redistribution, to which tax systems in developing countries were earlier geared, should be pursued through other instruments such as expenditure policy. This is because nominal direct tax rates which are highly progressive provide sufficient motivation for evading taxes. The emphasis therefore in recent years is to shed the "progressive" orientation, collect larger revenues through broadly uniform taxes and use them towards poverty alleviation through spending policies. In principle, the change has been from attempting to level down the incomes of the rich to operating efficiently a simple, uniform (neutral) tax structure; while the levelling-up of the incomes of the poor by grants, subsidies etc. is attempted by a different arm of the government, using other mechanisms.

The changes that are taking place on the fiscal scene are unlikely to benefit NGOs. On the one hand, tax administrators feel that fine-tuning the tax structure to provide incentives to a small group such as NGOs is not likely to be productive in terms of future revenue collection and would resist such attempts as burdensome and likely to reduce the efficiency of the taxation system. On the other hand, tax and other incentives (such as quotas), which are considered important in inducing the private sector to invest in particular industries and areas and in attracting foreign funding into individual countries, have a significant impact on tax collections, and hence on government grants available for NGO activities.

Further, the liberalisation of prices and the lifting of subsidies on food, transportation, energy, water supply etc., which are also part of the economic adjustment package in many countries, have generally increased price levels (relative to incomes), and reduced the surplus available for private donations to NGOs and community development work. The decline in real incomes may induce many women to enter the labour market and/or men to take on an additional job, thereby reducing the time which they can devote to voluntary work. Cuts in real public sector salaries and reductions in the size of the public sector and its staffing would reinforce these trends.

### 3.2 *Government Grants*

However, grants provided by government can act as an incentive to NGO development, depending on whether they are used to stimulate NGO activities in a particular field or are in response to NGO pressures. When government funding is tied to specific schemes and programmes, this financial dependence may reduce the NGO sector's flexibility to respond to newly emerging needs. The extent of direct subsidy by government appears to be highest in the small

countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, Fiji. In Hong Kong, most voluntary agencies are receiving 70-80% of their income from public funds, 15-25% from public and private donations and the rest from fee-levying; all recognised social welfare, rehabilitation and community development services run by NGOs are government-funded.

Where governments provide grants for service provision, the NGOs become accountable, but monitoring tends to concentrate on financial aspects, since government agencies are usually inadequately staffed to provide close supervision of quality and effectiveness. As the grant-giving unit generally does not monitor and appraise programme performance prior to making the allocation, the quantum of the grant given does not depend on performance levels. Some grants may not change over a period of decades e.g. the Malaysian government grant to the Federation of Family Planning Associations has not changed since 1966 and the Sri Lanka government per capita grant for residents of NGO-run social welfare institutions has not changed since 1989. In Hong Kong, however, NGOs are expected to provide services of the standard specified and government focusses its control on the measurement of output and performance, while maintaining overall financial monitoring.

In India, funding for the work of voluntary organisations has been provided since independence through various government organisations, at central, state and district levels, some set up specifically for this purpose. All government funding is available for specific schemes and programmes, largely formulated by the government, within its own policies and framework of development. It is only rarely that a proposal evolved by a voluntary organisation on its own can receive funding from a government agency. Information on procedures and the assistance available is not easily accessible. *"The various steps in the procedure entail considerable delay, require personal visitations by the leaders and staff of voluntary organisations to concerned government departments and officials, occasionally engaging in corrupt practices to seek approval and release of grants"* (Tandon, 1991, p.75). Moreover government institutions e.g. the District Industrial Centres, which are supposed to be one-window institutions helping those starting small ventures, are understaffed and inadequately equipped to carry out their mandate.

In Malaysia, the government provides outright grants to registered NGOs particularly those active in the fields of health, welfare, education, sports and culture. However when NGO proposals and reports are forwarded to the authorities, they may or may not respond, or may respond only after a long period, keeping the NGOs in the dark over the status of their proposals (Ghee, 1991, p. 68). In Thailand, where the state contribution in cash or kind to NGOs is very limited, the assistance which is available is trapped in bureaucratic conditionality and when NGOs seek such support from government, there is

insufficiency of response (*Muntarbhorn*, 1991). However there is a small provision under a line item in the Ministry budgets for grants to NGOs without adhering to government procedure.

A lack of awareness of the types of fiscal incentives available or a lack of ability to deal with the procedures involved is most often found among the small grass-roots NGOs. Consequently they may be more prone to a lack of stable funding and of competent staff; and this in turn limits their absorptive capacity. The participation of these NGOs in project implementation is also sometimes precluded by government procedures on procurement and purchase of goods and services which require competitive bidding, proof of experience, official registration and financial guarantees.

Several countries provide small grants to NGOs, in keeping with their limited absorptive capacity. As in Sri Lanka, however, the flat rate per capita grants for inmates under care in NGO-run institutions are generally totally inadequate. Bangladesh provides small annual grants from the Social Welfare Council and the Bangladesh Women's Welfare Council; although the total value of the funds provided is small, a large spectrum of local grass-roots NGOs are assisted e.g. hospital committees, clubs for skill training, literacy etc., mothers' clubs, women's committees. All relevant government departments have a line item in their budgets to enable them to give grants to NGOs.

Several countries have also devised special public sector funding arrangements for NGOs. In India, CAPART (the Council for the Advancement of Peoples Action and Rural Technology) which is registered as a society, operates under the aegis of the Department of Rural Development to channel funds to NGO activities in fields not directly funded by other Ministries/Departments, e.g. employment creation, integrated rural development, social infrastructure creation and dissemination of rural technology. In the Philippines, NGOs can get funds from the Presidential Social Fund (at the discretion of the President) and from Congressmen, out of money allocated to them by the Department of Trade and Industry to lend to NGOs for small enterprise development. In Indonesia, funds from a privately-run lottery are channelled through the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Provinces and allocated to NGOs through Regional Coordinating bodies and the Provincial Committees on Sports. The Thai government gives seed-money to the provincial authorities to set up NGOs. In Bangladesh, the Palli Karma Shahayek Foundation has been set up by local government to provide grants to NGOs for on-lending to micro-credit schemes in poverty reduction projects.

Its current concern with income distribution has prompted the Finance Ministry in Indonesia (Decree No. 1232) to require state-owned enterprises to set aside 1-5% of net profit for social programmes to assist small-scale industry

and weaker groups. Telecom, Pertamina Railway, Garuda and the State Banks have such schemes at present, but there is no standard procedure for distributing the funds and they tend to be underutilised. However the scheme has been bringing NGOs closer to government in a working relationship.

In more affluent countries such as Singapore, the government assists NGOs to recruit staff, allocates disused government buildings at nominal rents or state land, helps NGOs to obtain premises within housing estates and funds up to 50% of capital and operating costs of facilities for the elderly, the disabled and family service centres run by NGOs. In Hong Kong, for services classified as "necessary", the government provides for the full cost of a basic standard of service; for services categorised as "desirable" funding is subject to budgetary considerations; key staff grants are available to cover part or all the salary bill of NGOs and administrative fees, rents and rates of service premises.

In the Philippines, Bangladesh and Indonesia, the professional development of NGO staff is emphasised by government. Professional Development Scholarships are provided in Indonesia to NGO staff to obtain training up to Doctorate level. A prerequisite is three years service in an NGO and selection is done by a national selection committee. After getting the scholarship many beneficiaries leave their NGO, but continue to work part time, thereby increasing NGO influence in society while making available their expertise to the NGO sector. The Ministry of Social Affairs also provides NGOs in this sector with management and professional work training. In the Phillipines some NGOs also assist the government in building the capacity of public servants.

Other assistance to NGOs include in-kind contributions e.g. land, new buildings, building extensions or maintenance; professionals from specialist ministries such as doctors, teachers for the handicapped etc.; and the temporary use of government buildings and vehicles. Sri Lanka also provides concessions on electricity and water tariffs to religious premises and charitable institutions.

### *3.3 Other Local Funding*

For small, local, community-based organisations, locally-available resources are the main source, and these are usually not tied to issues. These NGOs usually focus on keeping overheads to a minimum through the provision of free services and voluntary time by members, on obtaining donations in cash and in-kind, and on running occasional fund-raising campaigns. Organisations which are service-oriented or campaign against issues such as domestic violence, are usually more successful in raising funds locally. NGOs which focus on worker/labour issues, the environment or human rights do not fare well because of their conflict with the dominant order's priorities and policies.

In some countries, however, local funding for NGOs is quite substantial. In Pakistan, *"the volume of private financial support that exists appears to be considerably greater than in many other developing countries... most small and mid-size NGOs currently raise the bulk of their support from private sources"* (Bokari, 1991, p.12). In Thailand too the availability of local funding is substantial; but contributions depend on the performance of individual NGOs and local fund-raising requires government permission. In Indonesia local donors (individuals and businesses) make very large contributions to NGOs (usually those under the control of government) and charitable institutions, prompted by a growing religious support for welfare activities and the government's emphasis on income redistribution. The larger Foundations fund the smaller ones and it is government policy to encourage the strong NGOs to work with the weaker ones.

Encouraged by tax exemptions, India has an array of unusual local funding arrangements for NGOs. Some businesses run highly professional and effective rural development programmes e.g. the Lupen Laboratories set aside considerable funds for rural development in Rajasthan; and Hindustan Unilever have combined rural development with profit for the company in running a successful milk production project in the rural areas of Uttar Pradesh. Instances of very successful cooperative endeavours are the papadam production by SEWA (Self Employed Women's Association) in Gujerat and the Kaira Milk Producers Cooperative. International Development Services is running a rural development project in Karnataka with money raised from Indian residents in the U.S.A. In Madras there is also a Working Women's Bank serving slum areas, using the Grameen Bank model.

Closer links between NGOs and business are also developing in Thailand and the Philippines, with the NGOs acting as catalysts which bring businesses (which have the skills and personnel) into contact with needy communities. The Thai Business Initiative in Rural Development (started in 1989 by the Population and Community Development Association) has a membership of 50 companies. The Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) started in 1971, and built up to 162 companies which pledged 1% of their net income before tax and another 50 companies which are sporadic donors. The PBSP earlier funded NGOs with this money, but 80% is now retained by the Corporations, which run their own community programmes. The Foundation now helps to identify groups and interventions, and goes in for institution building and training for NGOs, government and grass-roots personnel.

However in other countries, e.g. Sri Lanka, local fund-raising is becoming increasingly difficult, especially for NGOs providing institutional care. The tradition of charitable giving is breaking down in the face of a consumer society and high inflation in some countries. In others, the local community may not

identify with the institution when it does not cater to a felt need or when those in care come from all over the country, as do the staff in many instances; and when the family or association which started the home may have broken up. The position is somewhat better for community-service providers e.g. day-care centres, which cater to an immediate need of the community and local parents' groups can often be organised to generate income.

The availability of credit to NGOs and the socio-economically weak whom they serve is facilitated in India by stipulations by the Reserve Bank that (i) 60% of total deposits in a district be given as credit advances in that district, to prevent the drain of capital from rural to urban areas; (ii) 40% of a bank's funds are lent to the "priority" sector at about 5% interest less than the normal rate and of this 25% of loans are given to the socio-economically weaker sections of the population. 1% of all loans are lent at 4% interest (without a government guarantee) to women, scheduled castes/tribes, landless labour etc. (iii) the designation of a "lead bank" in each area which works out a credit plan taking into account the total capacity for lending and credit needs and coordinates all credit given to the priority and weaker sectors, parcelling out the loans to be given among the banks in the area, thereby facilitating access to credit by these groups. NGOs registered as approved societies can get credit at the concessional rates at which it is provided to the "priority" and "weaker" sections, if the benefit of their activities are going to either of these groups.

The most recent and innovative initiative, however, is the setting up of a National Credit Fund for Women under the Department of Women and Child Development to guarantee women's access to credit as part of the Structural Adjustment Programme Safety Net; funds will be routed through designated large recognised NGOs to smaller ones, thereby encouraging networking and the creation of umbrella organisations; and the flow of information and expertise available with the larger organisations to the smaller ones. However, to initiate the Fund, the States are to provide matching funds to those put up by the Centre.

### *3.4 Foreign Funding*

For larger initiatives, where government funding is not available, the dominant source has become foreign funds. Foreign funding, however, is usually tied to issues, the most popular, at present, being "women" and "the environment". This also introduces foreign influence over the agenda of NGOs, which are based on foreign perceptions and particular issues, rather than the evolution of programmes based on a systematic analysis of local reality. Some donors see NGO involvement in public sector programmes as part of a strategy to reduce inefficient public bureaucracies and enhance the role of the private sector. Others see it primarily as a means of making development processes more participatory and transparent. The availability of additional resources by way

of foreign funds has certainly generated innovation and experimentation and encouraged new initiatives, technologies and models.

Most foreign funding to voluntary organisations comes from NGOs in the North, partly from church groups, partly from secular NGOs which raise resources from the public and sometimes from their governments, and partly from Foundations (a predominantly North-American phenomenon). Bilateral and multilateral aid is mostly channelled by governments to their own agencies. Funding from solidarity groups, trade unions etc. in the North are generally restricted to specialised counterpart institutions.

*"Pakistan's NGO community is remarkable for its lack of contact with international funding agencies and with counterpart agencies in other Third World countries" (Bokari, 1991, p.9). A contributory factor may be that "Out of thousands of registered NGOs in Pakistan, probably less than a dozen have skills acceptable to international funding agencies" (p.11) i.e. an acceptable level of management skills, planning ability or financial control.*

Funds are often transferred from donor governments to international NGOs headquarters to give these bodies the necessary flexibility to work without government interference. Most of the activities supported by organisations such as the Ford Foundation and the Inter American Foundation or international NGOs such as OXFAM and CARE are funded through direct funding mechanisms. Direct funding increases speed and flexibility in the use of funds and can be effective in reaching and supporting groups that are left out by government policies. It allows for innovative approaches and may also increase beneficiary participation. However there are disadvantages as well i.e. sustainability after these sources dry up; the difficulty of coordinating with government programmes if government channels are avoided; a lack of influence on national policy making and macro-strategy; and the difficulty donors and foreign NGOs have in closely monitoring in-country activities to ensure accountability (*World Bank, 1992*). NGOs have been known to market the same project to several donors and obtain funding for it several times over.

When funds come direct from foreign NGOs, the local procedures instituted for controlling these flows are not entirely effective, particularly in countries where exchange controls are almost non-existent. Thailand does not have any controls on receipt of foreign funds, but if the donors wish they can channel their funds through the Department of Technical & Economic Cooperation. Indonesia, however, requires that NGOs obtain all foreign funds through the government and that there should be an agreement between government and the foreign donor/international NGO; registration by the NGO with the Ministry of Home Affairs is a prerequisite to qualify for foreign grants. However several large NGOs bypass this procedure and get funds directly through the banking system.

About 80% of the funds received annually through official channels in Bangladesh goes to about 25-30 of the largest NGOs. However a complete record of NGO foreign receipts is not available to government, since some NGOs receive foreign assistance directly from foreign agencies; other donors allocate funds to NGOs from their local accounts, which are held in scheduled banks for their local offices, and are exempted from the procedures of accounting required for foreign donations received through the External Resources Division.

To the extent that NGOs receive foreign funds through their government, they tend to lose out in the competition with government departments for funds, but they can be held accountable for them. The Philippines has instituted approval procedures of three kinds to increase transparency regarding approval of foreign grants (i) where the framework, eligibility criteria implementing and reporting mechanism is decided between the donor and the government during bilateral consultations, the donor can go ahead and implement the agreement with the NGO (ii) if an NGO wants to access a government foreign-funded programme it must be accredited with that Agency; but if the proposal does not form part of an ongoing project, it has to be evaluated according to a format worked out (iii) Assistance provided directly by foreign NGOs to local NGOs is also allowed and is not monitored by government.

### *3.5 Collaborative Funding Mechanisms*

A more recent development in terms of funding mechanisms has been the setting up of Socio-Economic Development Funds (SEDF) jointly funded by governments and bilateral or multilateral donors to support grass-roots activities. They are multi-sectoral and involve NGOs as intermediaries to turn large amounts of funds into small sub-projects, using more flexible and transparent procedures. The Janasaviya Trust Fund (JTF) started in 1991 in Sri Lanka, is a mechanism of this nature. It works through funding of partner organisations (which include government and non-government entities) to promote employment generation through rural works programmes; to support the human resource development of beneficiaries and the institutional development of its partner organisations; to run a programme to enhance nutritional intake in children, pregnant women and lactating mothers; and to provide credit through NGOs for income generating projects. Generally an SEDF does not implement sub-projects, but promotes specific activities, appraises sub-projects presented for funding, supervises their implementation and monitors their effectiveness. The JTF however has had to get involved in field-level activities in social mobilisation and with primary-level grass-roots organisations because the NGO response has been poor, partly because of uncertainty created by the NGO Commission.

NGOs themselves have developed effective cooperative fund-raising mechanisms in Singapore and Hong Kong i.e. the Community Chest. Established as an NGO in 1968, the Hong Kong Community Chest has 113 members, including NGOs ranging from large multi-service organisations to small ones catering for specific groups; its primary function is to raise funds from the community for social welfare purposes and channel the funds to its members. In Singapore, the Community Chest was set up by the Singapore Council of Social Services as a central voluntary fund-raising body for those NGOs providing direct welfare services, to relieve them of the burden of fund-raising, to promote greater efficiency in fund-raising and better use of donated funds and to improve accountability: in certain instances the government matches 100% of funds raised e.g. 25th Anniversary Charity Fund. In China, the provision of social welfare services by NGOs is largely dependent on income generated by their own economic activities. In Indonesia, many of the large NGOs have tried to fund their own programmes by rendering consultancy services and engaging in research and publication at a professional level; but concentration on fund generation tends to undermine the priority given to projects and programmes.

Another innovative approach which reduces foreign influence to a minimum, was recently introduced in Sri Lanka by the Research and Application for Alternative Financing for Development (RAAFD) Foundation. It provides a credit guarantee to a local bank which can be used by an NGO to borrow against. When the repayment is not made, the bank cashes the guarantee; this facility has been extended to Uvagram and Sarvodaya, supported by IRED (*de Fonseka*, 1991). A further development has been the formation of an association of business, NGO, professional and grass-roots leaders which supports income generating activities at the grass-roots level; and combines with a bank on the basis of the RAAFD guarantee, to provide venture capital to purchase equity in rural industry.

However in general, funding mechanisms have not kept in step with the widening role of secondary and tertiary level NGOs in the community. Governments and donors tend to design NGO funding procedures to suit their own requirements and administrative capacity, without paying sufficient attention to improving NGO viability or their capacity to continue to serve the community. As larger amounts of funds are channelled to and through the NGO sector, accountability becomes an increasingly serious issue, particularly as NGOs are sometimes considered as an alternative conduit for foreign aid.

#### **4. Building NGO Capacity for Planning and Implementation**

Many of the constraints that prevent NGOs from effectively functioning in planning and implementation roles originate from the very nature of voluntary, non-profit organisations and the size and level of their operations; others arise

from the environment in which they operate and their relationships with government, business and the community.

The ultimate goal for the sector should be for community development and awareness to reach a level where secondary and tertiary level NGOs will play a less and less determining role in the development process, shifting from being mobilisers, channels for resources, and providers of technical and managerial support for community groups, to coordinators and eventually technical advisors, at the most; and gradually handing over their service provision functions to grass-roots peoples' organisations.

Hence the main focus of the recommendations will be on the needs of micro-level village societies and building their capacity to develop self-sustaining structures through which the poor can address their own needs, have access to productive assets and services and manage their own resources. Long term funding availability and capacity building to manage these funds are key factors for grass-roots and other NGOs in sustaining participatory activities well beyond the lifetime of a project.

#### *4.1 Organisational and Staff Development*

Most NGOs have no office or permanent staff and are usually dependent on one particular individual to run the entire organisation. Consequently overheads are low and their activities are cost-effective, but record-keeping and accounting are generally neglected. Most remain isolated, work with limited resources and hardly have the capacity to manage and operate even small-scale projects, e.g. to obtain the necessary financing, inputs, technology and marketing outlets. Their activities are limited either to benefit their own group or to serve a specific need in the immediate community. In general they tend to be regarded as temporary phenomena with individual NGOs dying out after implementing a particular project or programme.

To promote their growth and viability, very small, local NGOs require basic institutional support e.g. assistance with writing letters to other NGOs or government departments, typing and photocopying facilities, a place to hold meetings and advice on how to maintain records and simple accounts. This type of assistance can be provided through a designated focal point at the local level, either a government office or a "lead" NGO, which could also serve as a conduit of information and a means of improving NGO-government coordination in local level programmes. International agencies and governments should pay more attention to grass-roots NGOs and focus on building them up.

Larger NGOs working at local and national level however require some professionalisation of their operations through infusion of technical expertise i.e.

training for their own office bearers in management and accounting and/or access to a technical pool which can service and advise these NGOs on preparation of project proposals, on accounting practices, and on specialised technical aspects relating to education, health etc. or to the needs of particular groups. These needs can be supplied by forming pools of professionals at different levels who are willing to serve on a voluntary basis to assist NGOs as required. Such technical pools could be coordinated and organised by a lead NGO in each area, or an "umbrella" NGO with local-level branches.

Common to large and small NGOs are certain human and organisational realities which arise out of their dependence on volunteers, who cannot be commanded and can be retained mainly through their commitment to a cause, personal development and fulfilment, etc. NGOs not only need to attract volunteers, but also to develop them and to manage them for performance. Where people want to serve a cause, there is also the challenge of getting them to perform up to standard and helping them to grow on their own terms, so as to avoid the problem of individual "burn-out" (Drucker, 1990).

NGOs also find it difficult to attract and keep suitable paid staff because they pay relatively poor salaries. Many of the workers, even those in institutions, are untrained youngsters who are waiting to get a job and consider social service as an "interim" stage. The uncertainty/discontinuity of NGO operations mitigates against them attracting and retaining competent staff.

*The very "big NGOs are big business in terms of competitiveness and growth ... when two interested parties start a similar NGO, business-like competitiveness creeps into an organisation and a spirit to do better than a competitor. True competition should breed competence and performance. As they grow into substantial organisations some decide to professionalise and seek paid workers to carry out the projects" (Russell, 1991).*

After the advent of foreign NGOs, there has also been competition for personnel within the NGO sector. Foreign NGOs, working on the principle that competent staff must be carefully recruited, adequately paid, trained and retained if the organisation is to be effective, are attracting good staff from local NGOs.

As economic growth accelerates, the disparity between the remuneration that the non-profit sector can offer and that available in other sectors will increase; so that the NGO sector has to look to other means of attracting and retaining volunteers and of obtaining the expertise required. These include human resource development schemes for volunteers and other NGO workers e.g. for recognition, grading or promotion, and mechanisms to encourage part-time voluntary work.

The social security provisions available for workers in the business and government sectors should also be extended to workers in the NGO sectors. This will facilitate movement of professionals into this sector for short periods of service. Labour laws and their application to NGO staff need to be clarified in several countries.

NGOs themselves need to develop their networking links, both locally and internationally to get access to resources provided by multilateral and bilateral agencies for upgrading the capabilities of NGO trainers, managers and organisers; and adequate field level experience should be ensured in providing training programmes for government and NGO managers. Government and international organisations could also send officials for orientation periods abroad, to see how governments operate in countries where NGO activity is strong.

#### *4.2 Financial Independence & Sustainability*

Many NGOs are facing difficulties in raising funds locally. Government grants are inadequate and do not fund the growth and development of the core of the NGO. In some countries, NGOs are becoming increasingly dependent on external donors for financing their development programmes. Even then, maintaining a satisfactory level of funding is a recurring problem for most NGOs, since the project-cycle approach is used by most foreign donors. The NGO moves from project to project and in the "interim" period, when one project or programme cycle comes to an end and another one has to be negotiated/approved, the period of uncertainty can reduce NGOs to inactivity or even to a situation where they cannot meet their overheads. Consequently NGO activity may tend to be piecemeal; experience and expertise of a permanent nature is not built up; institutional reserves are not accumulated so that an NGO can become self-sufficient eventually; and they have to depend on a small core faculty and a large number of contract staff who move from one organisation to another with little commitment to the values and principles of a particular NGO.

Resource constraints and short-cycle funding also hamper any long-term research commitment which may be required by the development perspective espoused e.g. sustainable development. For instance, if new technologies are demonstrated before they are adequately tested, they may subsequently turn out to be faulty, causing losses to the recipients (*Bebbington & Farrington, 1993*).

The sustainability of the non-profit organisation requires the consistent development of funding sources, whereby the organisation creates a constituency that supports it because it believes the organisation deserves support. Rather than working on the basis of raising funds, which tends to be a sporadic activity, the NGO manager needs to follow a different strategy to market the NGOs

services and obtain the funds required to do the job. He has to define the results (at least partly quantified) to be achieved by a particular effort and report back to the donors to show that these results are being achieved. He also has to educate donors so that they can recognise and accept what the results are. There are the immediate results; and then the long-term job of building on those results. *"Constituency building over the longer term results in these people seeing the support of the institution as self-fulfilment"* (Drucker, 1990 p. 58)

A central fund-raising body, such as the Community Trusts of Singapore and Hong Kong, where funds are also channelled and monitored by the same agency, would remove much of the burden of fund-raising from individual NGOs, introduce greater expertise into fund-collection and constituency-building, ensure accountability, and encourage the consistent capacity-building of NGOs and their staff.

Banks should also provide assistance to NGOs by way of "bridging" finance to avoid discontinuity in NGO operations, and small "start-up" loans, possibly with a credit guarantee as provided by RAAFD. A stipulation that a certain percentage of total deposits have to be given as credit advances in the district in which it is generated will increase the availability of credit in rural areas for NGOs. A 'lead NGO' in the district could also coordinate negotiations for credit by smaller NGOs and assist with organising input procurement, marketing and entrepreneurship training.

Governments should develop effective mechanisms for channelling foreign development assistance and direct government assistance to NGOs. The current "subcontracting" arrangements which exist between line agencies and NGOs, often involve voluminous paper work, complex auditing/accounting procedures and result in delayed fund disbursements and project implementation. Governments should also explore innovative ways by which specific budget allocations or use/access to government utilities and services could be made available to NGOs. Simple non-bureaucratic guidelines could be instituted to ensure that such resources accrue to the intended target groups.

Solidarity among NGOs at regional and international levels should be encouraged by international agencies such as ESCAP to mobilise resources from donor countries for NGOs, and to standardise policies and conditions attached to such donations. The UNDP Representative in each country could coordinate donor funding to NGOs so that duplication of funding is avoided and recipients are not unfairly pressurised. Discussion of policy, strategy, as well as individual projects should be attempted. Information on NGO activities in the region could be disseminated through ESCAP.

### 4.3 Accountability

Whereas a business earns money on its own, the money of an NGO is not its own. Rather the NGO holds it in trust for the donors. The NGO Board is the guardian of that money and is responsible for making sure the money is used to attain the results for which it was given. Accountability to donors is therefore in terms of showing them that they are putting their money where the results are and accounting to them for the performance of the NGO. Hence the objectives for which the funds are to be used must be clearly stated and the results (at least partly) quantified.

Often the State seeks to control NGOs in the interests of national security because NGOs are seen as pressure groups which do not have to be accountable to the public, whereas elected politicians are at least legitimised in periodic elections. While accountability and transparency need to be promoted in management, particularly for those organisations which receive large amounts of resources from local and overseas sources, NGOs cannot work effectively under restrictive laws or orders which limit the right to assemble, freely associate, obtain information and conduct public debate through all forms of media. Regulations against subversion can and have been used against NGOs in ESCAP countries. Repressive legislation should therefore be removed and replaced by mechanisms to emphasise financial and office-holder responsibility.

NGOs are generally against any government-sponsored central agency coordinating or monitoring their activities. Hence NGOs themselves should come together to develop their own Code of Conduct/Ethics and agree on a self-regulatory mechanism whereby complaints can be investigated e.g. about misuse of funds, politicisation of programmes, involvement in unlawful activities etc. NGOs should collectively be able to evaluate their own roles and programmes to improve their strategic planning and management, their accountability and productivity. Some form of apex organisation, which can fulfil these functions and provide a forum for the NGOs themselves is therefore necessary.

Alternatively, an Ombudsman Committee directly responsible to Parliament could be established to hear all complaints against NGOs and be empowered to investigate, make recommendations and impose penalties. The Ombudsman Committee could be composed of equal numbers of representatives from the state and NGO sector, chaired by a retired judge (*ANGOC-APDC*, 1991).

Large NGOs should publish their accounts and make them available to the public at a central place. NGO members should be kept informed of the broad activities of the NGO. Beneficiaries should know what should be provided to them by the NGO under the project and be able to monitor the use of funds managed on their behalf. Where salaries are much higher than in government,

this should be discussed and a justification provided. Transparent funding mechanisms foster trust and confidence among participants as well as partner NGOs. "Ghost" NGOs can be identified/controlled by the development of local NGO networks and by including NGO representatives on public bodies which allocate funds.

Governments, on the other hand, should also be aware that they are in a position of public trust. NGOs constitute a significant segment of their organised constituencies, so that NGO participation should not depend on donor requirements or selective partnerships but on the basic principle of the accountability of government to the people.

More openness about the programmes conducted by the different line agencies of government is also needed. Often there is no systematic, effective way of disseminating or retrieving information and NGOs have to rely on personal contacts. This can result in wasted effort, duplication of activities and lost opportunities. The principle of "transparency" therefore needs to be backed by a strong policy on information access and dissemination.

#### *4.4 Inter-organisational Relationships*

The relationships between NGOs, the community, business and government in most instances depend on their perspective of the role of NGOs and their contribution to development within the socio-political framework in each country. In each country therefore, there needs to be a clear statement of what current government policy is towards NGOs, both local and foreign, setting out the conditions and concessions available and the legal and administrative framework within which NGOs should work. NGOs, on the other hand, recognising that government has the most resources to support development on a macro scale, should try to influence how these resources are utilised and ensure that the benefits accrue to the intended target groups. Ideally the relationship between government and NGOs should be one of growing trust, based on equality, mutual respect and awareness of complementarities, preserving NGO autonomy while encouraging partnership in policy formulation, planning, implementation and evaluation.

The development of an NGO Apex Organisation to provide a recognised forum for government-NGO consultation, although attractive from the government and donor point of view, has not been a success in many countries due to the failure of such organisations to attract and retain a sufficiently large NGO clientele. To be effective, a coordinating agency must succeed in generating a climate of co-operation among its membership towards a shared goal and well-articulated strategies, provide a high level of technical expertise to service constituent NGOs needs, make appropriate linkages with existing resource and

research centres, etc. With this in view, existing "umbrella" organisations should shed their project implementation activities and build up their member organisations to carry out projects. An existing "umbrella" organisation may have to be upgraded to play the dual role of providing an effective forum for government-NGO interaction and inter-NGO interaction. Where there are several "umbrella" organisations, an NGO Coordinating Council could be set up with a rotating chairmanship.

To dissipate the climate of distrust, where it exists, NGO representation in various committees and state boards should be continued and widened to bring about regular contacts and dialogue. The establishment of liaison officers in each Ministry may be considered. More Ministries, government agencies and municipal councils should include NGO representatives on their boards or set up new "public-hearing" committees in which NGOs, business representatives and others can convey their views and help in formulating inputs for policies and plans. When large NGOs or NGO Consortia can meet with large government departments in a congenial atmosphere, they can play a constructive role in the mainstream of national development and generate some degree of social accountability and social consciousness.

NGOs are now turning their attention to active collaboration with local government in the context of devolution and decentralisation; some also find it easier to work with local officials. However, local level coordination between government agencies and NGOs, among NGOs themselves and among government agencies themselves needs to be strengthened. Beneficiaries and NGOs involved in partnership programmes with government seldom have anyone at local level with whom they can discuss their problems. The staff of central ministries at local level sometimes lack motivation and training to manage funds and projects. Or else, the centre is reluctant to delegate authority, while at the local level there is a distrust of central decision-makers. Hence mechanisms for regular consultation between government agencies and NGOs at local level are necessary and sub-regional units of government agencies should be given authority to negotiate/collaborate with local NGOs.

NGOs should also network more with other groups. They should build up a rapport with Parliamentarians so as to influence policy-making. In many countries, the private business sector has yet to be brought in effectively to support NGO activities with their finances and technical expertise. Businessmen should also become involved in preventing those abuses that arise from the business sector itself e.g. child prostitution, child labour etc. Peer group pressure exerted through business councils and associations can be effective in reducing such exploitation. The mass-media, which have played an important role in supporting NGO activities in many countries, have also to be brought into an alliance with NGOs to support their family development strategies, since the

family has to be dealt with as a whole, whether in terms of poverty or social problems. Awareness creation among media-personnel is therefore necessary for the potential role they can play in supporting NGO methods and concerns.

Non-monetary forms of support which give recognition to the NGOs contribution, are also important. For example, through mention in government reports of NGO work done and partnership activities undertaken, specification in the national plan of areas of work for NGOs where they have comparative advantages and proven capabilities, consultation of NGOs by government departments in policy and programme formulation, exchange of expertise, recognition of NGOs as coorganisers of national campaigns, and reduction in the administrative and procedural bottlenecks and time taken to respond to NGO initiatives.

NGOs should also be permitted easy access to specialised facilities and expertise for technology development which are available in the government sector, when they lack the necessary capacity themselves. When the technology development work being done by government lacks relevance for NGOs or public research institutes do not function effectively, they can attempt to influence and change the research done. However, *"it is a significant and complicated transition for NGOs to move from merely adapting GO technology to changing the sorts of research GOs do in the first place, for this implies a direct relationship with government"* (Bebbington & Farrington, 1993). Where this is not possible, NGOs have to seek support from other national or international institutes or seek government resource commitment specifically for technology development (Bebbington & Farrington, 1993). Mechanisms for sharing NGO research, reports and documentation also need to be developed to avoid the same research work being done again.

The concept of a "one-stop shop" for investors can be extended to provide a combined service for foreign NGOs as well as an effective method of monitoring them. Uniform procedures for registration, standardised reporting and a common set of obligations should be specified for both parties. An NGO liaison unit can coordinate the activities of NGOs, avoid duplication and competition and provide a forum for discussion of common problems in NGO-State relationships e.g. with regard to the extension services, bottlenecks, corruption, political interference. Government can keep NGOs informed of changes in the national policy framework and priorities so that NGOs can go into particular areas or undertake joint programmes with government. The unit can also keep government organisations informed of the role of these foreign NGOs and government policy towards them. An annual audited statement of the funds received and spent by each NGO should be submitted by the NGO and the banks concerned and a periodic review of individual NGO programmes conducted. If an NGO decides to "pull out" of the country, contractual obligations to its staff should be enforced by this unit (Alailima, 1991).

## 5. Conclusions

NGOs have played an important role in Asian countries, supplementing government service provision where it was inadequate and assisting with development activities. However in most countries, the number of effective and efficient NGOs which can fully participate with government in generating growth and development, in the policy-making and programming cycle, in implementation and at different levels of national organisation, is relatively small.

While the trend is towards drawing NGOs into a closer relationship with government and donors, this will necessitate that NGOs become more accountable to them. Increasing NGO involvement in programme implementation may reduce the time available to them for organising and empowering the poor, for innovation, and for promoting participation and transparency. On the other hand, acting independently will reduce their influence over the larger policies which influence the context in which they operate. The terms of the relationship offered by each government are therefore important and it is evident that a redefinition of the traditional roles of governments and NGOs is taking place.

## References

- Alailima, P. (1991) "Private Sector in the Provision of Social Welfare Services in Sri Lanka". In: *World Bank Private Sector Assessment Study*, mimeo.
- ANGOC-APDC (1991) "The Growth and Impact of NGOs in Malaysia" Paper presented at *Regional Dialogue on "GO-NGO Relations in Asia : Prospects and Challenges for Improving the Policy Environment for People - Centered Development"* APDC and ANGOC, Thailand.
- Bebbington, A & Farrington, J. (1993) "Government, NGOs and Agricultural Development: Perspectives on Changing Inter-Organisational Relationships". *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 29, No.2, pp. 199-219.
- Bokari, A.S. (1991) "The NGO Sector in Pakistan : Its Role and Challenges" Paper presented at the *Regional Dialogue on "GO-NGO Relations in Asia; Prospects and Challenges for improving the Policy Environment for People-Centred Development"*. APDC and ANGOC, Thailand.
- de Fonseka, C. (1991) "*Country Study on Sri Lankan Government/NGO Relationships and Cooperation*" APDC, Kuala Lumpur.

Drucker, P. (1990). *Management of Non-Profit Organisations*, Harper Collins, New York.

Elridge, P. (1989). "NGO's and the State in Indonesia". *Prisma* (English Version) No. 47 LP3S, Jakarta pp. 34-56.

Ghee L.T. (1991). "National Approaches to Cooperation between Government Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations in the Planning the Delivery of Social Services in South-East Asia" In: *Government - NGO Cooperation in Social Development*, UN-ESCAP, New York.

Government of India (1991). *Eighth Five Year Plan : 1992-97*. Planning Commission, New Delhi.

Hamili, S.L, (1991). "Philippines : Cooperation between Government Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations in the Planning and Delivery of Social Services : Dilemmas and Challenges". In: *Government - NGO Cooperation in Social Development*, U.N. - ESCAP, New York.

Khan, S. (1991). "Cooperation between Government Agencies and Non-governmental Organisations in the Planning and Delivery of Social Services in Bangladesh" In: *Government-NGO Cooperation in Social Development*, UN-ESCAP, New York.

Lazo, L. & d' Silva, Y (1992). "Homeworkers in Indonesia : Who Cares?" In: *Homeworkers of South-East Asia : The Struggle for Protection in Indonesia*, ILO, Bangkok.

Muntarbhorn, V. (1991). "Government and Non-Governmental Cooperation; a Profile of the Children's Sector in Thailand" In: *Government-NGO Cooperation in Social Development*, UN- ESCAP, New York.

Russell, R.I. (1991). "Corruption is not a Disease that attacks only NGOs" In: *DANA* Vol. 16, Nos. 1 and 2, Colombo.

Tandon, R. (1991). *Voluntary Development Organisations in India*. New Delhi.

World Bank (1992). *Participatory Development and the World Bank : Potential Directions for Change*, Ed. by B. Bhatnagar and A.C. Williams. *Discussion Paper* 183, Washington.