

Problems and Challenges in Implementation of the Provincial Development Program in Indonesia

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This paper by Lockman Soetrismo and Mubyarto looks at the experience of Integrated Rural Development Projects around Indonesia. It suggests that much can be – and has been – achieved by requiring development planners and programs to focus on regions and on poor people. They see a need for change in the culture of development planners and managers and believe that training like that conducted in various Area Development Programs made considerable progress in changing the way local government officials view the rural poor and their problems.

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Introduction

The Provincial Area Department Program (PDP) is an effort by the government to introduce a "new development culture and system" in Indonesia. The history of development in Indonesia is marked by the role of the central government which is very pivotal in creating and continuing development in Indonesia, while the regional governments and community function as the implementors of development programs that are planned by the central administration. In a "development system and culture" like this, the aspirations of the regional governments and the community concerning development are often neglected. In the 1950's, this almost became a major political issue which then reached its peak in movements in the regions that threatened the unity of the nation. This centralistic "development system and culture" brought about other problems in the development process in Indonesia, that is, the problems of sustaining the results of the development programs. The government and community in the regions do not feel responsible in maintaining the development programs results because they feel that the programs in their regions are "central government projects in the regions", thus, it is not the responsibility of the regional governments and community to continue these government projects. PDP attempts to overcome these consequences of a centralistic development system and culture by granting a more central role in the development process to the regional governments. In relation to this, BAPPEDA, Level I and II, must take a larger role in planning and implementing development in their own regions. From the historical viewpoint of development in

Indonesia, PDP represents a landmark. However, it is precisely because of this new approach that PDP must face many problems and challenges before it can institutionalize itself as a system in Indonesia's development process.

As with the matter of development in Indonesia itself, the primary problem and challenge facing PDP is its sustainability as a development system/approach in Indonesia's future.

This paper aims to present the problems and challenges in developing and sustaining PDP with the hope that it can become a system and approach to regional development which strives for self-reliant villages and regions.

The first two sections will focus on the economic aspects and the following sections will present the sociological, bureaucratic and institutional aspects of PDP'S problems and challenges.

PDP and the Challenge of Poverty

One important PDP mission is the implementation of development programs, especially so that poverty which persists in certain rural areas can be reduced. If development programs which are oriented towards "area" development succeed, then two positive aims will be achieved simultaneously: *first*, the aim to improve the welfare of those whose lives are still deprived, and *second*, the aim to narrow the gap in incomes (and levels of prosperity) between "rich" areas and "poor" areas, or between urban and rural areas. For instance, in the DIY province, PDP, in the form of the Rural Development Project (RDP = Proyek Bangun Desa), was centered initially in the "poor" *kabupaten*, that is, Gunungkidul and Kulonprogo in 1980,

and then beginning in 1988/1989 will be expanded to "poor areas" in the Sleman and Bantul *Kabupaten*.

One problem faced in the implementation of development programs, like Yogya RDP in *poor* areas is that these areas actually are no longer densely populated, but rather often have been "abandoned" by its population, whether on a permanent or temporary basis. The convention of *mboro* (leaving home temporarily to work) in the population of these poor areas which leads to the assumption that there is an "excess of manpower", apparently, is often misleading. As a result of this misconception, many projects to develop certain estate crops in the effort to improve *land conservation* do not achieve the anticipated success. Similarly, in the wet-rice fields in rural areas that are relatively "wealthy", the tendency for the youth to feel dissatisfied living in the village complicated this "employment opportunity problem". Parents who still live in the villages prefer it if their children leave the village "to look for work in the city", so that there is the impression that eventually these areas will "become empty" as their population, especially the youth, leave.

On the other hand, officials or project implementors are often amazed as to why the population of these very difficult and poor areas like those described, for instance in *Rongkop* and *Tepus* sub-districts in Gunungkidul, are determined to stay there and do not decide to leave for other areas or places that are "better" via the transmigration program or migrating to the city.

If we ask them directly "Why don't you transmigrate?" or "Why don't you move to the city?", we soon realize that questions such as these are often "stupid questions or are the questions of someone who does not understand the problem." If the transmigration program worked "perfectly" and *all* of the residents of Tepus and Rongkop who had already transmigrated did indeed find success in the new areas, then it can be expected that the areas of Tepus and Rongkop would soon be empty. Also, if the cities of Yogyakarta and Solo, for instance, developed rapidly and were able to provide work for *all* the very poor residents of Tepus and Rongkop, then the houses there would never be inhabited again.

In reality, it is just the opposite, that is, that both transmigration and work opportunity in the cities are still not convincing. Indeed, these two "roads out" have already been tried by part of the population and perhaps many have succeeded. Nevertheless, on the whole, the "risk of failure" is considered great enough so that most of the population feels "safer" staying at home or *mboro*, that is, leaving the village or their families "temporarily to seek additional income", and making an effort to return home again at certain times, for instance, at rice or second crop planting or harvest times.

If we consider the "average expenses" as "average incomes", then the rural population of Yogyakarta as charted in Table 1 suggests several conclusions:

- (1) Transmigration to Kalimantan clearly is not appealing because the average income in the new place is actually lower than the average income in Yogyakarta, for instance, in Rongkop and Tepus.
- (2) Urbanization to Jakarta is the most appealing because their incomes can rise almost two-and-one-half (2½) times.
- (3) *Mboro* in the city of Yogyakarta can add to their incomes (their incomes can increase up to 1.6 times), but this increase is *not high enough* to motivate them and all of their families to move permanently.

Thus, it can be concluded that the challenge of rural poverty which we face is still complex. Several policies to directly overcome this problem have been implemented and, to a certain extent, have been successful. Nevertheless, on the whole, the features of the problem have not yet changed dramatically. In 1970, when we started *Repelita*, urban income was 1.4 times higher than the income of the rural population, and in

1976, it rose to 1.8 times. In 1987, it increased again to 1.9 times. The widening of the income gap between the urban and rural populations indicates that the equalizing programs via rural development have still not succeeded. Or, it can be said that development is still biased in favour of the cities.

Yet, if we analyze the data more carefully by separating these income disparity, figures for Java and "non-Java", as

TABLE 2 Development of Urban-Rural Income Ratios in Indonesia, Java and outside of Java, 1969-1987

Year	Indonesia		Java		Outside of Java	
	Ratio	Change (%)	Ratio	Change (%)	Ratio	Change (%)
1969 - 1970	142	30	163	28	122	22
1976	184	1	209	-11	149	19
1987	186		185		177	

Source: BPS, Susenas 1987, Income estimated from Average Expenses per Month.

in Table 2, we find an interesting phenomena:

From the figures in Table 2, it is apparent that during the *Repelita* development period 1969-1987 (18 years), the disparity between urban and rural incomes indeed rose. However, in the past 11 years (1976-1987) this rise has been very insignificant (1 percent compared to 30 percent during the 1969-1976 period).

There is a large disparity between the Javanese and non-Javanese areas in the achievement of results in the equalizing programs. If this process of increasing inequity continued with relatively high intensity (19 percent compared to 22 percent in two periods in Table 2) outside of Java, then in Java, this process has clearly been reversed. The equalizing programs in Java have shown concrete results. The ease of transportation

and communications between village and city in all of Java, apparently has made a large contribution to the rise of income in the rural population.

Equalizing Development Between Regions

In the most recent issue of the periodical *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (EKI)* (Indonesian Economic and Finances), vol. XXXV, No.4, 1987) there is an

interesting discussion about the disparity of regional incomes in Indonesia. J.S. Uppal and Budiono Sri Handoko, who wrote an article in the previous EKI issue, stated that, among other things, there was a tendency for the disparity of incomes between regions in Indonesia to decrease during the period 1976-1980. This conclusion was not accepted by Daniel Kameo and Piet Rietveld who added data from one year prior and two years after the years 1976-1980. They pointed out that the disparity of regional incomes tended to rise. The data presented in the two articles are shown in Table 3.

Apart from our agreement or disagreement with either the first or second opinion, we must note that a disparity between regions does exist and, apparently, that it is difficult to overcome through various short term policies.

PDP, which began in 1976, via a co-operative project with USAID in LUWU in South Sulawesi and then expanded to eight provinces in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Java, and Nusa Tenggara with aid from several other donor nations, aims at helping to reduce the development disparity between regions. This means that PDP is a program to increase the community's incomes by raising the incomes of the low-income community sector in rural areas directly and as quickly as possible.(1)

TABLE 1 Comparison of Average Expenses per Capita per Month in Rural Yogyakarta Urban Yogyakarta, Jakarta and Kalimantan, and Rural Kalimantan, 1987.

Area	Average Expenses Per Capita	Rural Index Yogyakarta = 100
Rural Yogyakarta	19,230	100
Urban Yogyakarta	30,576	159
Urban Jakarta	46,038	239
Urban Kalimantan	33,407	174
Rural Kalimantan	18,253	95

Source: BPS, Pengeluaran untuk Konsumsi Penduduk Indonesia per Provinsi, 1987: (Consumption Expenses for the Indonesian Population per Province, 1987).

TABLE 3 Disparity Co-efficient for Regional GDP per Capita outside of Mining.

Year	Regional Disparity Co-efficients (V10)	
	Uppa & Budiono	Kameo & Rietveld
1975	-	0.469
1976	0.463	0.476
1977	0.461	0.477
1978	0.434	0.443
1979	0.524	0.524
1980	0.444	0.541
1981	-	0.518
1982	-	0.508

Source: Daniel Kameo and Piet Rietveld, *Regional Income Disparities in Indonesia: Comment EKI, Vol. XXXV, No.4, 1987, page 453.*

It appears that it is not as easy as was imagined for PDP to achieve its goal of equalization. In practice, the regional development economy has sources not only in APBN or APBD, (national and regional budgets) but also draws from the private sector with bank credit. If the APBN funds from certain levels can be "channeled" to poor areas, then the income disparity of these areas can directly be decreased, but investment from the private sector *almost always* is channeled to "wealthy" areas that are already better equipped and those products are more easily marketable. That is why 61 percent of PMDN and PMA (domestic and foreign investment) funds "flowed" to Java from 1968 through 1987. Of this, 43 percent of PMDN funds were located in DKI Jakarta and the area of West Java around Jakarta, while the corresponding figure for PMA is 59 percent.

It can thus be understood why the intensification of regional development or the improvement of equalization between regions is not fully dependent on only the efforts of the government via APBN/APBD. Thus, it can be said that PDP and regional development gains in general are, apparently, still not very significant in the effort to narrow the gap in income differences between regions.

It is clear that the tendency for development (and growth) to be centered on Java, especially Jakarta, is still heavy. The average income of Jakarta's population in 1987, which was Rp 46,035 per capita per month, is 2.6 times the average income of residents of Central Java province. This inequality or income disparity between DKI Jakarta residents

and the other three provinces in Java is indeed disturbing.

This difference in incomes is the reason why Jakarta is a "magnet" for the populations outside of Jakarta, for even residents from outside of Java who "migrate" to Jakarta. The process of this population movement, which is rather worrisome, also contributes to the quick increase of economic growth in Java and reduces the opportunity for economic growth outside of Java.

PDP and the Mentality of Indonesian Bureaucracy

PDP must be considered as a development approach which aims *not only* to change the balance of power between the central government and the regions, but also aims to plant modern ideas in the Indonesian bureaucratic circles regarding development management.

In trying to reach the first objective, that is, the balance of power between the central government and the regional governments, PDP, perhaps, does not face many problems. It is certain that this objective can be achieved if PDP provides technical planning skills for the staff of BAPPEDA Levels I and II and makes available sufficient development funds. The problem actually emerges when we consider how we should prepare a bureaucracy at the regional level which will have the *mentality suitable to the spirit of PDP* as an approach in the development process.

The spirit of PDP as a development approach is *participation* - participation of the regional governments in development and participation of the community in the development projects in their regions. Thus, decentralization, which is assumed by the originators of PDP to be the foundation of PDP, must be interpreted as not only the granting of power from the central to the regional governments (read: provincial), but also as the granting of power in planning and managing development from the provincial governments to the regional *kabupaten* governments. Also, the fact that decentralization is meaningful also for regional community participation in the development of their regions is equally important. This means that for PDP to succeed a new *mentality* in the regional government bureaucracy for *organizing* the government in their region is necessary.

The new mentality which is required by the regional government bureaucracy is related to their perception of the *community's role* in the development process. The tradition that exists in Indonesian bureaucracy is to consider the people as their "subordinates" and not as their "superiors". This kind of mentality clearly *does not support* PDP implementation. A larger role in the development process by the regional government will not help quicken the achievement of Indonesia's development objectives if the bureaucratic mentality described above does not change. If the

TABLE 4 PMDN and PMA 1968 through 1987

	PMDN		PMA	
	Project	Million Rp.	Project	Million Rp.
Java	2,896	24,645,314 (61.0)	677	11,994.7 (63.0)
Sumatra	724	8,224,170 (20.4)	92	3,461.6 (18.1)
Kalimantan	506	3,904,563 (9.7)	54	443.7 (2.3)
Sulawesi	219	1,529,974 (3.8)	18	1,402.5 (7.4)
Moluccas, Bali Nusa Tenggara Irian Java, etc.	243	2,045,268	45	1,740.6
Total	4,588	40,349,289 (100.0)	886	19,043.1 (100.0)

Source: BPS, *Indikator Ekonomi, December 1987. Figures in parentheses are the per cent of the total*

planning skills of the BAPPEDA Level 1 and Level 11 apparatus are not supported by a change in the mentality of the regional government bureaucracy, then the development process a la' PDP will retain its centralistic nature.

With the purpose of planting a new development culture in the regional government apparatus, the central Java PDP program and similar ones in other provinces in Indonesia, like IAD in East Kalimantan, held a training program in "bottom-up" planning which all members of BAPPEDA Level 1 and 11 and members of agencies involved with PDP were required to attend. This training program did indeed succeed in providing a *new understanding* for the attendees of the importance of bottom-up planning in promoting the *success of development*. However, the results achieved by the exercise will quickly be lost if the social-political environment of the administrative apparatus does not change.

One of the social-political environments, which is most influential regarding the institutionalization of the new "development culture" created by PDP, is the work environment of the previously mentioned apparatus. The (present) work environment of the regional government apparatus is often guided by a "top-down culture" which opposes the new development culture accepted by the trainees.

A "top-down" work environment can kill the "bottom-up" spirit newly acquired by the administrative apparatus. The success of "bottom-up planning" will be determined by the will of a group of regional governments to institutionalize the culture as the basic management pattern of the group. In other words, PDP's efforts to plant "bottom-up planning" in its own regional government apparatus will succeed only if each group which is involved in district development planning also is willing to change the old "top-down" pattern to become a "bottom-up" pattern. The understanding of the importance of "bottom-up" planning will remain a *conception* and not become a reality in the regional development management process if the director of an agency or a Bupati still prefers employees who are submissive rather than those who like to make proposals at staff meetings. Also, the PDP development approach will be difficult to institutionalize if the regional governments continue to *disregard criticism* from the community. Such a domestic social-political environment is an important

political condition if we wish to institutionalize the PDP regional development model.

The problem of democratizing the social-political environment is felt to be even more important at the village level where PDP development activity is concentrated. Based on past experiences, the rural community in Indonesia has suffered a paralysis of initiative; without orders from above, they will not take any initiative on their own.

This problem of the loss of the rural community's initiative is basically a political problem because the problem concerns the *equalization* of political rights between the Village Head and the residents; a situation which has long been felt to be unbalanced. Law No. 5/1979, which arranges the rural government structure and outlines the duties of the Village Head, does not yet answer this problem and, rather, it is felt to strengthen the existing biased situation. The decision that the Village Head will also serve as the General Director of LKMD, illustrates the extent of the Village Head's power. The Institute for Rural Community Resilience (LKMD, Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa) is an institution which, according to Law No. 5/1979, can function as a forum for community participation in development planning and implementation in the rural areas. However, this objective cannot be achieved because the Village Head, as the general director of the institution, often directs the institute's programs to the interests of the central government or the regional government, and not to the villages own activities. Besides the domination of the Village Head in LKMD administration, there is also a problem of poor functioning due to the lack of educated personnel who can efficiently hold positions as LKMD members. Members of LKMD, in essence, have the same function as the BAPPEDA staff, because they, too, are expected to be able to formulate development plans for the village. The average educational level of the LKMD members in rural Indonesia, except for teachers in the village, is that of elementary school graduates. Most of the rural population who have intermediate or high school experience, leave their villages and go to the city to seek employment. In such a situation, the ability of LKMD as an institution which can function as a "BAPPEDA" at the village level is very limited.

To attack this problem, the government has created the Rural Develop-

ment Cadre, and several have already been incorporated by sectoral agencies. However, the cadres often do not perform as anticipated by the government. Several problems are faced by the cadres in their efforts to function effectively. After being trained, often the Rural Development Cadres are not used by the Village Heads and LKMD officers. This problem emerges because there is no clear regulation explaining the positions and duties of the Rural Development Cadres. Aside from that, many cadres, upon finishing their duties, leave their positions because they must face the problem of their own economic welfare. In general, the cadre in the villages are small farmers. As cadre, they must undertake two roles, that of the supporter of their families and of the servant of the community. This latter role often imposes heavily on their time. In such a situation, they often decide to resign from their position as a cadre and expend more of their time supporting their own families. Incentives in the form of official uniforms for the Health Cadre, for example, will not prevent the cadre from continuing to serve as cadre (sic). A large number of cadres leave their duties and this is why the government's objectives to fill the intellectual void in the village, where (the filling of that void) is one of the requirements for creating a rural development program which is truly "bottom-up", can not be achieved. If we wish to institutionalize the PDP regional development model at the village level, then the problem of *incentives* for the cadres must be solved.

It is, indeed, impossible for the government to give incentives in the form of money to the cadres, and this is not expected by them. A different form of incentive, such as the granting of livestock, can be considered by the government. Extensive pressure on the obligation of the community to volunteer in developing their village (via government projects) will not help to solve this problem. It is inhumane to require the cadres to dedicate themselves totally to serving their community's needs while their own family's economic life remains one of "scarcity"

Planning Boards, Government Agencies and PDP

One element in the success of PDP as a development approach is how far BAPPEDA Level 1 and 11 can carry out their functions not only as the primary planning bodies in their regions, but also as coordinators and supervisors of development activities executed by other

services in the region. In other words, the success of PDP is very dependent on whether BAPPEDA is accepted as the *master* by the services/agencies in their regions.

Historically, BAPPEDA, as a part of the development planning apparatus in the development world in Indonesia, is indeed younger than the other institutions. Long before BAPPEDA emerged as the agency responsible for development in the regions, the other service agencies had been functioning as "creators" of development in the region. This situation gives rise to several special problems for BAPPEDA in facing these services. As the newcomer to the "world of development" in Indonesia, BAPPEDA does not yet have sufficient experience in regional development planning or expertise in development problems that exist in each region. On the other hand, because they have long been involved in regional development, the other services have considerable experience. In such a situation, it is logical if we observe that BAPPEDA lacks *authority* with the services agencies in their regions. With the excuse that the local BAPPEDA lacks experience, the service agencies are reluctant to place all of their development activities under the local BAPPEDA supervision and coordination. This attitude cannot be separated from the attitude of the service agencies "headquarters" in the central government; that is, the departments, towards the local governments. Like the service agencies, the departments still *doubt* the capabilities of the regional government and their staff (including BAPPEDA) to create and implement developmental programs on their own. Several procedures have been taken by the departments so that their activities in the regions could "circumvent" the requirement that they be coordinated by the regional government, either at the provincial or *kabupaten* levels. For instance, the Department of Public Works arranged their work areas in the regions so that it appeared that there weren't any projects in the jurisdiction of a single *kabupaten* government. Similarly, the Department of Forestry arranged their work area on the basis of hydrologic unity and not on administrative boundaries (M. Morfit, 1986).

Based on Keppres (Presidential Directive) No. 28, 1980 and Inmendagri No. 1, 1981, it has been determined that one of the duties of LKMD on the village level is to coordinate all development activities conducted by the go-

vernment at the rural level. However, in reality, *perhaps* only the implementation of development projects that originate from the Department of Home Affairs are coordinated by LKMD. Meanwhile, the other departments conduct their programs directly at the village level *through* various groups which they form themselves. The Department of Agriculture has a Farmers' Group which functions as an instrument of agricultural information dissemination for the farmers. The Department of Information also formed a Farmers' Group, which is called Klompencapir, which also functions as an agricultural information disseminator for the farmers. The overlapping of programs in a situation such as this is unavoidable.

Secondly, the PDP effort to institutionalize BAPPEDA as "master" in the field of regional development in its own area also faced a problem which originates from the existing distribution system of development funds in Indonesia. Service agencies obtain development funds directly from their own departments to finance development activities in their areas. In these matters, BAPPEDA does not have any *legal right* to determine the use of funds to develop programs suited to regional priorities. The service agencies *automatically* use the funds to finance the development programs that have been selected by their own departments through *technical guidelines (juknis)* and *implementation guidelines (juklak)* which are issued by their own departments. The independence of the service agencies in the matter of funding, whether for *development* or *routine* programs, is the reason why BAPPEDA has encountered difficulties in *coordinating* or *supervising* their development activities in their region. The function of BAPPEDA as *coordinator* and *supervisor* of all of the service agencies' activities is dependent on whether or not BAPPEDA coordination and supervision will do away with service agency autonomy in using development funds which they control. As long as BAPPEDA coordination and supervision does not restrict the rights of the services to use the development funds they control, then they *will not reject* the presence of BAPPEDA as their *coordinator* and *supervisor*. However, the opposite will occur immediately if these agencies see BAPPEDA interfering with the use of the development funds they control.

PDP in Central Java and the Yogyakarta Rural Development Project until the present time have succeeded in establishing BAPPEDA as coordinator and

supervisor of the services' development activities in each of their areas. However, it must be noted that this success is due to the fact that BAPPEDA *controls the development funds* that originate from donor nations/organizations, that is, *USAID* in Central Java and the *World Bank* in the province of Yogyakarta (DIY). BAPPEDA channels the funds to the agencies involved in the PDP program. The situation would, perhaps, be *different* if PDP directly channeled the development funds to the agencies involved with the PDP programs. Here lies the reason why people are beginning to ask: can the success of PDP be sustained if the sponsor nations or organizations discontinue sponsoring the PDP program which then must proceed via development financing procedures which exist presently in Indonesia? In other words, can BAPPEDA integrate service development activities in regional development planning if they no longer control independent development funds? It is apparent that an important lesson to be gained from the PDP trial in several provinces is that *there must be a change* in the policies regulating the distribution of development funds that will make it possible for BAPPEDA to control independent development funds. Aside from this, there needs to be a policy that will make it possible for the Level I regional governments to be able to work *cooperatively* with sponsor nations to procure development funds which can be managed by the regional government for regional development objectives based on the PDP approach.

Third, in addition to the two problems presented above, the problem of institutionalizing BAPPEDA as the primary development planner in the region arises from the regional government's organization itself. At the present time, BAPPEDA has taken over many duties that were previously carried out by the *Planning Bureau* and the *Development Bureau* of the Governor's office. The relationship between BAPPEDA and these two bureaus is presently unclear. BAPPEDA receives all reports on development activities implemented by the government in each of their regions, except the report on development financed by *Inpres* funds (M. Morfit, 1986). The report on *Inpres* projects is received by the *Development Bureau* and not by BAPPEDA. A similar matter occurs at the *kabupaten* level where the relationship between BAPPEDA and the two bureaus is also unclear. This non-clarity of relationships can threaten the institutionalization of PDP as a development

approach in Indonesia.

From the discussion presented above, it can be concluded that if the government wishes to establish PDP as an approach to development in Indonesia, then the government must have the political will to institute basic changes in the procedures for providing development funds and to eliminate the *ambiguity* which exists in development administration in Indonesia in general.

Conclusion

PDP is an approach to development which clearly aims to establish equity via decentralizing the implementation of programs. Poverty and the disparity of incomes between regions are two of the prime reasons for the execution of PDP. PDP aims its programs at a specific target group, that is, the rural poor.

The problems and challenges faced by PDP in the field are sufficiently numerous, whether from the technical aspect or the institutional one. Quantitatively, PDP and regional development programs in general, apparently have not been successful in closing the gap between areas. The reason for this is the fact that development is implemented not only by the government, but also by private enterprise. There is a strong tendency for domestic and foreign capital to be planted in the most advanced areas and those areas which are closest to the concentrated population centres, that is, the relatively "rich" areas.

From the viewpoint of institutionalization, PDP's success is very dependent on the success of BAPPEDA, Levels I and II, in establishing themselves as an institution/coordinator which can be relied upon, which has authority and which is able to impose discipline in development projects for the sectoral agencies in the region, but at the same time is flexible in attending to the aspirations of the community and interests of groups in the region.

This paper by Loekman Soetriono and Mubyarto looked at the experience of Integrated Rural Development Projects around Indonesia. It suggested that much can be - and has been - achieved by requiring development planners and programs to focus on regions and on poor people. It saw a need for change in the culture of development planners and managers and believes that training like that conducted in various Area Development Programs made considerable progress in changing the way local government officials view the rural poor and their problems.

KURUNEGALA IRDP

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project period in the district it is expected that the general money supply in the district would have increased resulting in some advances made towards commercialism and development activity, with more inflation effects, than before. While the project's impact on such aspects could not be isolated by the survey it is our opinion that the massive investments made through the IRDP would have had some effect in maintaining the overall quality of life in the district, and perhaps helped some of those below the poverty line to improve their income levels, at least during the project period.

Replicability and Limitations

The 'blue print' approach, of the Kurunegala IRDP Project, though rigid for a target-oriented path, was found to be useful in containing sectoral political pressures during the implementation process. These features taken together point to the possibility of the KIRDP framework being replicated elsewhere, with suitable modifications.

During its implementation period (1979-1986), the KIRDP has been successful in making large investments in the physical development of the production bases of paddy and coconut as well as the social infrastructure and other related amenities within the district. All components of the project, except water management, are recorded to have achieved the targets with minimal delays. The shortfall in the cumulative performance of irrigation rehabilitation, however, is attributed to several reasons. Construction delays relating to minor tanks as well as handing over delays in respect of rehabilitated tanks are adduced as the main causes that led to the long time lag in initiating the envisaged programme of improved water management under the project.

The inadequate recognition given to people's participation in project activities is reflected in the 'blue print' as evinced by its central focus placed on the improvement of services and inputs, both material and infrastructural, mainly towards achieving physical targets. This inevitably resulted in a situation where the emphasis was more on strengthening the 'delivery mechanism' rather than the 'receiving mechanism' at the beneficiaries' end.

The absence of an effective mechanism, particularly during the early years of the project, to express the farmers' needs as regards the design and implementation of the minor tank rehabilitation component was a deficiency. However, a relatively recent move by the project management to introduce a system of prior consultation and discussions with beneficiary farmers in regard to the rehabilitation of minor tanks is a step in the right direction.

The diminishing profit margins of the farmers due to the rapidly rising input prices are likely to have an adverse effect on their decisions regarding the adoption of modern production techniques so necessary for increasing their output. This trend is discernible both in paddy and coconut production.

It appears that the crop agriculture bias of the project has precluded it from investing on a programme of rural industrialization. The long-term beneficial effects of such a programme may have resulted in rural employment generation as well as in diverting the surplus labour from agriculture. No evidence is, however, available to suggest that a sustained process of employment generation has ensued from the project. Despite a total project expenditure of around Rs. 430 million, it is unfortunate that a mechanism was not set in motion to monitor the benefit flows and the impact of the project. This deficiency points to the need to incorporate a management information system in future projects.

Being the first attempt at using a 'blue print' for a district development programme in Sri Lanka, the project obviously had certain limitations. Nevertheless this approach, which helped to obviate local and external pressures, yet proved flexible enough to accommodate changes on the basis of both objectively valid reasons and implementation experiences, demonstrated itself to be a successful model.

The small cadre of staff deployed at the project office, perhaps necessitated by the 'blue print' concept, also proved to be a cost-effective way of administering the project. Thus, adding strength to the model, the overall results of the project presented in this study, in terms of physical targets and the degree of inter-agency co-operation achieved, exemplify the validity of its replicability.