
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former Rebels for Sustainable Peace in Sri Lanka: A Post-war Challenge

Abstract

With the end of war and the surrender or capture of about ten thousand Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam cadres, the question of their rehabilitation and reintegration has emerged as one of the major issues in the post-war development discourse in Sri Lanka. Practically, it is impossible to hold all the former combatants under custody, as they would become an eternal burden on the state. Releasing majority of the rebels, without adequate support, would also create a number of social issues, threatening the transition from post-war to sustainable peace. Therefore, it is imperative to introduce an effective rehabilitation and reintegration regime without too much delay. While examining the challenges of a rehabilitation and reintegration regime in Sri Lanka, this paper proposes a three-track and four-stage process for a lasting peace.

Introduction

The civil war between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka caused a multitude of issues in the country. The termination of the LTTE in May 2009, while resolving some of the issues of the war, created other politically sensitive problems. One of these issues is the question of Rehabilitation and Reintegration (RR) of LTTE cadres who survived in the final assault and surrendered to or captured by the government security forces. This paper, while examining the problems involved in RR of the former combatants, examines a number of policy options. Why is it important to rehabilitate and reintegrate the ex-LTTE cadres into their own communities? what are the challenges of an effective RR regime in Sri Lanka?, and what should entail an effective RR scheme in the post-war scenario? are

the primary questions that guide this paper. The paper relies heavily on secondary data and the author's personal understanding of the needs and cultures of the population involved for the analysis. Extensive research has been undertaken, especially in Africa, on what is popularly called the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) of former combatants. The African experience has been used as a theoretical framework.

Background

Some sections of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka has been struggling for gaining greater regional autonomy to Northern and Eastern provinces, based on notions, as perceived by those sections, of marginalisation from the post-colonial nation building process and discrimination by successive governments. The non-violent struggle failed as the radicals among the protesters, especially the youth, increasingly turned to violence for political purposes, forming militant movements. One of these organisations was the LTTE, which, in the later stages, emerged as the only militant organisation to confront the government security forces violently in order to establish a separate state called the Eelam. As some of the other Tamil militant organisations were violently crushed and others joined the LTTE, the rebel strength grew in terms of manpower. Membership of the organisation in the early 2000s was estimated to about 15,000. A combination of battle field experience gained by fighting with, especially, the Indian military in Sri Lanka called the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), vast amount financial resources amassed through financial transactions, some of which were highly questionable and

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money collected from Tamil diaspora and the ability to smuggle in large quantity of sophisticated weapons into the country, made the LTTE the most powerful Tamil militant group in Sri Lanka. The armed resistance of the LTTE led to a high-intensity civil war, resulting in a state of hurting stalemate. The sheer determination of the government which came to power in November 2005 to re-establish a civil society in the country, and the adequate international support received to fight terrorism made possible re-capture of vast terrain of territory from the LTTE. First, the Eastern Province and then most of the Northern cities, including Kilinochchi, which served as the centre of the LTTE operations, were freed. In the first half of the 2009, the LTTE, including its leadership, was cornered in the Vanni region. After a prolonged struggle and an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe, the LTTE leadership was eliminated. With the killing of Velupillai Pirabakaran, the founder leader of the LTTE, in May 2009, the civil war came to an end, officially and otherwise. As the defeat became imminent, many LTTE cadres started to surrender to the government. Another segment of LTTE cadres were captured as they tried to hide among the civilian population. Currently, it is believed that about 10,000 former LTTE members are in the custody of the state. It is in relation to these ex-LTTE combatants, the question of RR has emerged and has been examined in this paper.

Sustainable Peace and Reintegration

The military termination of the LTTE and the end of war have created different images of the society and *current status of the conflict*. Some people opt to believe what exists in Sri Lanka today is the peace, as war no longer exists. Others call it a post-conflict period. It can however, be argued that what exists today is neither peace nor post-conflict situation. Although war has ended, conflict-centred hostilities still continue at various levels. According to broader definitions of violence, for instance one provided by Galtung (1996), structural and cultural violence related to and produced by the conflict are still a factor. It is not post-conflict either. Concerns and problems and grievances, as perceived by the communities involved in the conflict, still remain. The end of the war has only resolved the problem of high-intensity violence.

Hence, the prevailing situation should be considered as one of transitional periods from post-war to peace. Peace is ideal when it is sustainable. Sustainable peace is a peaceful social condition that could last for generations. Therefore, the challenge for Sri Lanka right now is to strategically move from the existing transitional peace scenario to sustainable peace. Sustainable peace requires measures at societal as well as political levels. For instance, according to former United Nation Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali (1994), a project for sustainable peace entails disarmament and decommissioning, restoring order, advancing human rights, and promoting political participation. Another critical element of sustainable peace in societies that were affected by protracted civil war is reintegration of ex-combatants (Schafer, 1998). Boutros Ghali (1994) pointed out that "the reintegration of combatants is difficult, but it is critically important to stability in the post-conflict period." He also maintained

that "Effective reintegration of combatants is also essential to the sustainability of peace" (Ghali, 1994). Reintegration is commonly understood as the "the process of facilitating the ex-soldiers' transition to civilian life" (Clark, 1995).

Why is it imperative to implement an effective program to rehabilitate and facilitate former combatants' transition to civilian life? There are four specific reasons. In the absence of systematic assistance from the state to return to normal life: the former combatants could be re-mobilised; they could indulge in selling arms and ammunitions to other groups in the country or the region as a means to securing livelihood; they could engage in criminal activities by forming or becoming part of underworld gangs; and they could become a burden to the society by developing psychological problem or turning into even mentally retarded.

Even after the elimination of the LTTE, the problems of the Tamil people, to which almost all the former LTTE cadres belong, remained to be solved. In this backdrop, if the ex-LTTE cadres are not helped to return to normal life as soon as possible, the unresolved problems could provide a ground for them to return to violence. This could happen at two levels: (1) a new Tamil militant group could emerge and lure the former cadres into membership or seek their assistance as they have the experience and expertise, and (2) the former combatants themselves could "self mobilise" (Ozerdem, 2002). Self mobilisation could take place for two specific reasons. First, carrying arms and struggling for a cause, bestow the militants a purpose in life. If they do not have a purpose as a civilian, it is easy for them to reverse the role and go back to jungles to carry out a guerrilla type resistance. It is possible that at least some of the former LTTE cadres may currently feel that they have let the struggle down, which on the other hand could force them, once

again, to take the responsibility and to achieve the goals of the struggle they carried forward with determination. Remobilisation is unchallenging if they are not engaged effectively in civilian activities. A successful reintegration program would provide them with a feeling that they have a role in their families and the society and would keep them engaged in economic activities, which, on the other hand, would minimise the possibility of re-mobilisation.

During the peace process of 2002-04, the LTTE was extremely confident of their military capacity and the ability to achieve their goal of the separate state by military means, which was one reason why the LTTE was not too serious about the peace negotiations. It was the LTTE, that in a way, claymored this government into war (Keethaponcalan, 2008). From the mid 2006, however, the rebels started to encounter several military setbacks and was withdrawing from areas that they captured. As the LTTE began to withdraw, in line with their general tactics, the rebels started to bury and conceal their weapons and ammunition in these territories for reuse when they return. But, now they cannot return as a movement to reuse these weapons and ammunitions, and the government is in the process of clearing the disputed territories to detect and recover the LTTE weapon system. Although the government security forces are recovering some weapons there is absolutely no guarantee that all the weapons will be detected. Therefore, at least hypothetically, it is possible that a large amount of weapons are in the villages and jungles, and the former cadres possess the knowledge of their whereabouts. In the post-war period, if the former cadres do not possess the capacity to earn living legitimately, which an effective RR program would offer, some of them would most probably attempt to use these weapons for commercial purposes. It is believed that when a group of LTTE cadres defected from the mainstream group

in 2003 and subsequently by force, demobilised, many of them sold their weapons to underworld gangs and politically motivated groups in the region, especially, in the Eastern Province. This could happen again. It is also possible that they try to smuggle weapons to violent non-state actors in the South-Asian region. Observers believe that the LTTE was in contact with and assisting several non-state armed groups in the region. These links could easily facilitate transfer of weapons, which, on the other hand, has the capacity to destabilise the country and the region.

There is a real possibility of increased criminal activities both in the North and the South, if a large number of former LTTE cadres are released from detention without adequate support. Criminal activities, including, robbery, theft, kidnapping and so on, could become attractive to a group that is used to arms and secretive activities. With the signing of the Indo-Lanka Pact in July 1987, a number of Tamil militant groups were forced to disarm as part of the agreement between India and Sri Lanka. Many members of these militant groups were demobilised and expected to engage in political work, but the package did not involve a RR program. The rebels, who gave up militancy found it difficult to cope with the situation where they were expected to operate as ordinary citizens without much support. As observed by the author, criminal activities, especially, in the Jaffa peninsula, multiplied as many of the former combatants turned to extra-judicial activities for living. This aspect of the issue could very well become a major social problem in the North. Meanwhile, criminal and underworld elements could also use former combatants in other parts of the country. The involvement of former Tamil militants in the recent spate of kidnapping of Tamil civilian, especially in Colombo, which terrified the Tamil community, could not be *totally ruled out. Only a systematic state-sponsored RR program could*

minimise the rather negative social impact of sudden demobilisation of large number of LTTE cadres.

The psychological impact of being a member of one of the ruthless militant organisations in the world and constantly taking part in brutal violent activities cannot be underestimated. There is ample evidence to prove the positive relations between violent socialisation and psychological disorder. For instance, psychological impact of violence on men, women and children has been well studied and recorded (See for instance, Punamaki, 1990). This could be especially devastating for children. Since children were involved as child soldiers, there is a need to pay particular attention to psychological needs of children and also other members of the LTTE in the RR program.

The LTTE during its existence in the last 25 years or so was a brutal enemy to civil society. The animosity among those people towards the LTTE was and is extremely high and hence many people may like the former rebels to be detained for a long time. It is possible that many of the hardcore members of the LTTE may be condemned to long-term jail sentences. Lack of an effective RR program would make them perpetual burden on the state. Meanwhile, it is also imperative to note that the state cannot, practically, keep all the LTTE cadres in eternal detention. At one point or the other, many of these cadres will have to be released from state custody. A better option, therefore, would be to treat the former combatants as a resource, which would benefit both the former combatants, and the society and the country as a whole. Before being treated as a resource, they need to be trained to live in a civil society. An effective RR program would include such a training and assistance.

Challenges

Implementing a successful RR program, *facilitating the former combatants' transformation into civilian life and*

through which ensuring the sustainable peace in Sri Lanka, will certainly be a challenging tasks. The following are some of the problems which could hinder a successful RR scheme:

Enmity in civil society: As indicated elsewhere, the LTTE remained an enemy for the civilian masses for over three decades. Many of the LTTE cadres who are currently under the state custody may have committed violence on them. The temptation, therefore, to treat them as sort of criminals in the post-war scenario seems high. Many people may like them jailed for substantial period of time. A RR process, on the other hand, involves, treating them as misguided and unfortunate youth and extending assistance. Public opinion in the country may view sympathy and assistance as unnecessary or unjustified. Even the notion that former LTTE cadres should be rehabilitated and reintegrated may be viewed with suspicion. If public opinion grow hostile for the idea of RR scheme, it will become difficult for the government to pay special attention to this issue and implement a sincere program. Hence, it is imperative to educate the masses and even the policy makers on the importance of a RR scheme in terms of sustainable peace.

Will of the beneficiaries: The desire in the government itself to rehabilitate and reintegrate the former LTTE cadres alone will not suffice to implement a successful program. Will of the former combatants to shed the erstwhile ideologies of separatism and violence and the desire to lead normal life as ordinary citizens are essential preconditions. If the intended beneficiaries still believe in the goal of separate state and trust that only a violent campaign will lead the community to a satisfactory state, the RR program will certainly fail. It is imperative, therefore, to make the former combatants understand that the goal of separate state is an impractical task and fostering violence will lead

only to further disintegration of the community and general instability. Proper political education, preferably by reliable actors, would help the intended beneficiaries understand the reality. Increased confidence in democratic values and legitimate political practices may also help the combatants to embrace the RR process and return to normal life.

Resources: Rehabilitating the former combatants and facilitating their return to normal life involved substantial expenditure. Rehabilitation and reintegration involve education, skills development schemes, counselling, assistance in terms of cash benefits, land, housing, and so on, which requires sizeable financial resources. Sri Lanka on the other hand currently is experiencing a serious financial crisis, largely due to the impact of long-drawn war and also partly due to the world recession. Owing to the contemporary financial difficulties, dependency on friendly states and international monetary institutions has increased. Only recently, the government secured a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Against this backdrop, it is not easy for the government to meet the financial burden of the RR program on its own. This is where international assistance becomes critical. Some observers advocate donor sharing of the burden, if reintegration programs are to succeed in any war affected society (Clark, 1995). Donor assistance could come in the form of financial assistance and sharing of expertise. Since Sri Lanka lacks expertise on RR issues, international assistance would be required for the success of the reintegration program in Sri Lanka.

Competition with other issues: One of the major problems the RR program would most probably encounter in Sri Lanka is the inevitability to compete with other issues for attention. Sri Lanka has no scarcity for social and political issues that need to be addressed more or less immediately.

Reconstruction of war-affected areas, especially in the Northern and Eastern provinces, welfare and resettlement of about 300,000 internally displaced people in war-affected regions, resettlement of large number of people who were expelled from the North during the war, addressing the development issues such as poverty and unemployment are some of those issues. These are equally important problems that need to be addressed by the government on priority basis. For instance, currently, the primary focus is on the issues of the internally displaced people in the camps. Therefore, one cannot expect the government to undertake RR programs at the expense of other issues. Attracting the attention of the government towards the reintegration needs of the former LTTE cadres would be a major task. The need of the hour is to find a balance between these issues and paying adequate attention to all of them.

Lack of a conducive environment for return: The idea behind rehabilitating and reintegrating the former LTTE cadres is to send them to their own societies. Reintegration, therefore, depends upon an integrated and normal society. Especially, in the North today, no proper social environment exists, families have disintegrated and a large number of people has been killed during the entire duration of the war. Many people cannot go back to their villages due to the problem of landmines and other unexploded ordinance. Therefore, there is a need to establish a conducive social environment for successful reintegration. Building conducive social environment and reintegration should go hand in hand.

An Agenda for Rehabilitation and Reintegration

This section proposes, briefly an agenda that could be adopted by authorities, concerned political actors and non-governmental organisations that are involved in the issues of rehabilitation

and reintegration of former LTTE combatants. We believe that the framework could at least form part of the discourse on this issue.

Three-track approach

The LTTE actively employed men, women and children in war activities as their women's wing and child soldiers formed an integral part of the rebel fighting capacity. When the war was ended, the surrendered or captured LTTE cadres included large number of women and children. These women and children have special needs, and require, during the rehabilitation and reintegration process, special treatment. Former women cadres, for example, will be expected to adapt to a completely different, rather traditional role in the society (Knight and Ozerdem, 2004). Former under-aged soldiers who have lost their innocence and childhood will be expected to behave as children again (Cohen and Goodwin-Gill, 1994). It is, therefore, imperative in the post-war period to be sensitive to the special needs of vulnerable groups like the women and children. Hence, one common framework for all former combatants will not be helpful. Adult men, women, and children have different needs, mindsets, ability to cope and roles to play in a normal society. In terms of needs, the adult men would need more vocational training, but children education. Children may be especially vulnerable during confinement. It was the inability of the policy makers to pay attention to the peculiarities of the former under-aged cadres that led to the massacre of Bindunuwewa. Therefore, the scheme should be implemented at three different tracks: adult men, women, and children.

We also propose a four-stage rehabilitation and reintegration process:

- (1) Rehabilitation under detention,
- (2) Return to the communities,
- (3) Reintegration, and
- (4) Exit of the implementing agency.

Rehabilitation under detention

There are arguments, theoretically, for and against confinement of former combatants in the post-conflict period (Knight and Ozerdem, 2004). Majority of Sri Lankans may like the former rebels in state custody for substantial period of time. The Tamils, especially, those who had their children and relatives in the LTTE, may want them released from the state custody largely due to the fact that the war is over. The author had heard from a number of Tamils that their children should be sent home without much delay. Majority of people may like punishment for the former rebels in the form of imprisonment, because they would view the whole issue as criminal activity. For many Tamils, the conflict, fundamentally, was not criminality and also they were forced into violence by the rebel leadership. Victims, they argue, should not be punished.

Regardless of the theoretical debate and arguments and counter arguments, this author is of the view that certain period of confinement of the former rebels is essential in Sri Lanka, not as a punishment, but an opportunity to prepare the former rebels for civilian life, one may call rehabilitation. The immediate release of the former combatants is not advisable also due to its possible negative impact on societies to which the combatants would return. Many of the former cadres have spent substantial time in the LTTE; thus violently socialised. They lack skills to live in a civil society. Lack of civic socialisation may lead to problems of violent behaviour and other sexual and criminal issues, which the societies may find it difficult to deal with. Therefore, the internment period may be also capitalised to socialise the cadres in to civilian life. If a legal process is initiated, the rebels who are produced in court would be sentenced to different jail terms, depending on their position in the LTTE and level of their involvement. Internment should

be short enough to give the person confidence that getting rehabilitated would have a meaning and long enough to complete the rehabilitation process. Also, commitment of the cadre towards violent struggle should also be a factor in the determination of the period of detention. The more committed cadres may need more time to shed their traditional beliefs and embrace rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation process primarily takes place during the internment period. It is not clear what exactly the educational profile of the cadres presently remaining under the state custody. It would, therefore, be advisable that all former rebels under state custody are provided with basic education, which should also entail health education, including, prevention of communicable diseases. It is possible that at least some members of the former rebels are more educated than others. These cadres may be provided with opportunities to continue from where they left schooling, which would give them the confidence that they could aim high. This year, a number of former LTTE cadres in detention were allowed to sit for the GCE (O/L) examination, which probably was undertaken with this philosophy in mind. The former under-aged soldiers would have left school in different stages. The same level of basic education to all the children would become meaningless. Children should be given appropriate level of education. All three groups should also be provided with necessary counselling assistance by trained counsellors.

Civic socialisation should be an important component of the rehabilitation process, which is needed for all three segments of the population involved. By being members of an extremely violent organisation that operated outside democratic ideals, these cadres have lost their capacity to be a citizen of an ordinary society, which to a large extent, believes in

democratic ideals. They, therefore, need to be provided with, during the rehabilitation process, skills required to be citizens of an ordinary society. Children might need stronger civic socialisation processes.

Vocational training should be an important part of the rehabilitation process. Vocational training will enable the target group to return to the society with confidence and find employment and settle down as civilians. It is however, imperative to understand that men and women might require different vocational training. In Sri Lanka, for instance, carpentry, electric work, wiring, driving, fishing, agriculture are popular vocations for men, and therefore, may be preferred by the detained men. Fishing and agriculture are the major means of economic activities in the Northern and Eastern regions. Emphasis on these two areas by way of providing modern techniques of fishing and agriculture, for example, might be useful in the long term. Given the cultural and economic back drop of the country, especially in the Northern and Eastern provinces, training in sewing, handcrafts making, small businesses, and primary-level teaching may be preferred by women. In fact, the target group should be given the opportunity to make informed decision about the field they want to enter into by getting adequate training during the rehabilitation process. Obviously, the beneficiaries would have some understanding about their preference, local demand and so on. But, input, based on systematic research undertaken in the areas to where the detainees would most probably return would help the beneficiaries to make informed decision about required training. The point is vocational training that will be imparted during the rehabilitation process should be based on demand-driven, based on informed decision of the beneficiaries (Kingma, 1997). Training for children

should include, for instance, singing, music, drama, yoga, etc.

Religion and spirituality have specific meaning for Sri Lankan life and people more often than not seek refuge in religion when challenged personally, economically, and socially. Therefore, creating adequate space for spiritual activities during rehabilitation and even training former rebels, if they consent to, in meditation, yoga and so on, may help the cause of successful reintegration.

Return to the communities

The idea behind rehabilitation is to reintegrate the former rebels into their own communities, where they can resume life as normal citizens. They, therefore, should be sent home as early as possible. Yet, knowledge and training alone will not help successful reintegration. They need material support to sustain their return, otherwise they will, sooner or later, be forced to raise resources from illegal and unethical means. Return to the society, therefore, should be combined with material support from the state or the implementing agency. Almost all the studies undertaken on rehabilitation and reintegration issues of former rebels, for instance, recommend initial cash payment for the returning former cadres (See for instance, Clark, 1995; Ozerdem, 2002). What is generally called cash insertions should be undertaken according to the actual needs of the former rebels to establish themselves in the community. Cash payment could also be made with the intention of providing an opportunity to the rehabilitated cadre to start small-scale business. Scholars, however, are of the opinion that there is little evidence to suggest that former rebels are successful in investing in commercial enterprises. Therefore, cash insertions for investment, if made should be coupled with proper training in investment and small businesses. In

addition, rehabilitated cadres should also be provided with, again if necessary, land, housing loan, basic household utensils to start the life without much difficulty. The former rebels should also be assisted with getting national identity cards, which is a must to survive in the contemporary Sri Lankan society, and other necessities like a bank, preferably saving account and so on.

Even on return, needs of former child soldiers are different. They need to be not only reintegrated into the community, but also into schools. This could prove to be the most cumbersome task. Children who have family and relatives to go back to should be assisted with gaining admittance in schools and provided with books and other materials needed for successful schooling. Special arrangements need to be made for children, who have lost their parents and have no relatives to go back to, which could include setting up shelters in the North. Shelters outside the native places of the children could be problematic in terms of cultural conflicts, protection issues and so on. Children could also be provided with bank accounts and so on to make their life meaningful.

Reintegration

Continuous assistance, combined with the readiness to accept the former rebels back into their societies, would most probably lead to successful reintegration of the rehabilitated rebels when they return. Successful reintegration and their progress in terms of economic activities should be monitored, preferably, by civilian institutions with capacity to report back to the state authorities of any undesirable developments. Assistance, if necessary, at a very minimum level or what could be called soft assistance, could continue until the former rebels are fully or at a desirable level reintegrated. At this point in time, assistance should focus more on advice

and guidance rather than material input.

Exit of the implementing agency

A RR scheme is, not only about the former rebels, but also about the agency which undertakes the program. The implementing agency's culture, interest and objectives, for instance, may have an impact on the program, which is why the proposed framework entails a component on the implementing agency. Obviously, the implementing agency would invest substantially in the program as well as the former rebels involved. The investment and the relationship that would develop between the implementing agency and the beneficiaries may lead to a mutual dependency for survival. Such a dependency would undermine completely the objective of a RR regime. Therefore, it is important that the agency have a pre-determined strategy to exist the stage once the objective of the RR scheme is achieved. This includes how to terminate the relations with the beneficiaries, what to do with the materials gathered during the RR process, and what to do with the staff or how to compensate the staff who would lose employment. What is important in this stage is to exit the setting without harming the already rehabilitated and reintegrated former rebels. Table 1 summarises this process.

Conclusion

As the war ended, and a large number of LTTE cadres, including children and women, surrendered to or captured by the state security forces, the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of former rebels has emerged as an issue to be dealt with immediately. This article takes the position that successful rehabilitation and reintegration program for former rebels is essential for sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. Without support, the former rebels could become a source of social unrest

Table 1: Proposed rehabilitation and reintegration framework

| Tracks | Rehabilitation | Return to communities | Reintegration | Exit of the agency |
|------------------|--|---|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Adult Men | Basic education Civic socialization Counselling Training in carpentry, electric work, wiring, driving, fishing, agriculture, meditation, etc. | Cash payment Other assistance including land, housing materials, loans, NIC, bank account, etc. | Monitoring Limited support | Slow and gradual exit |
| Women | Basic education Civic socialisation Counselling Training in sawing, handcraft, small business, primary teaching, meditation, etc. | Cash payment Other assistance including sawing machine, kitchen utensils, etc. | Monitoring Limited support | Slow and gradual exit |
| Children | Appropriate level of education Civic socialisation Counselling Training in singing, music, drama, yoga, etc. | Facilitating schooling Assistance including school bags, books and other materials, saving account, etc. | Monitoring Limited support | Slow and gradual exit |

and even violence, politically and otherwise. Therefore, a systematic rehabilitation and reintegration process should be introduced, preferably with the state patronage. The proposed rehabilitation and reintegration process would entail, primarily four stages, including rehabilitation scheme, return of the former rebels to their communities, reintegration and exit of the implementing agency. Since adult men, women and children have different

needs and the roles to play on return, the scheme should be undertaken in three different tracks. During the rehabilitation process the former rebels would be inducted with necessary education, training and socialisation. While returning, the former rebels will have to be supported with cash and material needs. The return will eventually lead to reintegration of the most of the former rebels. With the successful reintegration, the implementing agency will be able to

exit the scene, leaving the former rebels to total independence.

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